From the NY Times article: "....Apple had asked the F.B.I. to issue its application for the tool under seal. But the government made it public, prompting Mr. Cook to go into bunker mode to draft a response, according to people privy to the discussions, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The result was the letter that Mr. Cook signed on Tuesday, where he argued that it set a “dangerous precedent” for a company to be forced to build tools for the government that weaken security...." Me: This is half way to the real facts as I see them.
https://twitter.com/snowden/status/700823383961792512 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/technical-perspective-apple-iphone-case And this is crazy http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnpaczkowski/apple-terrorists-appleid-passcode-changed-in-government-cust
OK, so you're saying that Apple is playing hard to get? And don't get me wrong I don't always agree with backdoors, for example the Juniper hack (see link) was unacceptable, but I don't see anything wrong with hacking systems from criminals. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-j...CN0V708P?feedType=RSS&feedName=technologyNews
It sets a precedent where Apple will get more and more "requests", not just from the US Government for legitimate reasons. It's quite a slippery slope. Plus, they'll potentially lose a lot of customers.
It's not about criminals, this story is just one of many where the "criminal" is the supposed target but the common citizen is always the targeted one.
It may set a precedent, but how is that an argument for not complying with a court order, and who will the other "requests" come from?
There's quite a lot of useful links and follow-up information at Schneier's (which clearly is more general than here in terms of scope). It seems like the legal arguments are by no means clear, and that this will keep the lawyers happy for ages. Nor are technical details straightforward. One thing I find strange is that people appear to ignore brand damage when considering compensation for helping out - given a market cap of $522bn, even a 0.1% loss of brand value equates to around $500m - which puts the technical work required into the peanuts category. If that's not burdensome, I don't know what isn't. I know when considering the impact of the UK's draft Investigatory Powers bill, if the clauses relating to communications providers being compelled to backdoor their products means what it could mean, there's no way I'd accept basing a software company in the UK, the reputational damage and uncertainty is way too punitive, so I'd move offshore, and take my chances with any attempts at extra-territoriality. Anyway, this is all very strange - for example, the deviation from doing this stuff under seal, so I'd caution that there are many manipulative currents going on here.
Follow on "requests" that people are concerned about is in reference to any customer phones seized from now on by law enforcement. Some have even made reference to foreign governments requesting phones be cracked for their own purposes. The slippery slope they are referring to is the concern that it may give license for more trivial searches, e.g. Border Patrol officers wanting a phone cracked if a traveler refuses to supply their pass phrase. The FBI has said that the phone in question is no longer considered a customer's phone as the individual who owned it is dead. The phone is evidence in a crime and is in police possession. Information on the phone may lead to information that will identify accomplices and their network. Apple said it has to defend its's brand and the police say they represent the victims of the crime. Apple said they will go to the Supreme Court to argue their position. The SC gets to determine dangerous precedent or not.
I don't think it adds much, but I noticed that the Schneier blog entry links to https://www.techdirt.com/articles/2...-requesting-can-work-modern-iphones-too.shtml and the latter briefly addresses the "works on newer phones with a SE" subject. Which is, arguably, what some people would want to focus on... making sure that newer/future phones can be configured to require PIN entry before updates and/or be configured to effectively wipe encrypted data when an update changes/weakens security functionality.
This is really my concern as well. If it was a single isolated case then I could live with it. The problem is that if Apple is forced to do this once then the tool is available. It is much simpler to re-request the tool than develop it in the first place (at least from a warrant perspective). The only viable solution is to have a single programmer prepare the code and after the job is complete destroy the laptop and execute the programmer.
Yes, once the tool/procedure exists there is no longer security through obscurity. Protection lies with the obligation of law enforcement to demonstrate probable cause. I hope the case will go to the Supreme Court. That won't stop people from arguing about it though
Seems Apple already receives LEA requests judging by a FAQ they've published. I don't think the FAQ has been mentioned here yet so here it is: http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/ I found this statement intriguing: Surely if you change the password, it is changed at iCloud too so you can log-in through a browser with the new password?
Agreed the statement about the phone not being able to access iCloud services after changing the password doesn't make sense. Perhaps someone who uses iCloud services could speak to this?
There are probably a number of Apple employees that already know how to accomplish the task and how to install the software on a locked device. Plus, more that could figure it out if they bothered to try. Plus, future new employees that would eventually fall into one of those categories. Slapping together a build that accomplishes this would probably be very easy for them, especially if they didn't bother to create superfluous code that attempts to assure it will only work on this one specific device.
Apple tells Justice Dept. to withdraw demands for help, says its objections are ‘absolutely not’ about marketing by Mark Berman.
This is just an "I am just saying" post. With the death of Scalia this SC case would likely be an exact 4 to 4 tie so then what? Please don't go nuts on this post its just the first thing that appears really obvious with the posture of the remaining 8 justices. I really hesitated to post this but this will be chapter two of how this situation goes down if it makes it that far.
Welcome to the world of Apple. I have an Ipod and the only thing I use it for is my banks Deposit App. I had to get and use a password to set up the darn thing. Just a couple of weeks ago IOS was updated. It wanted my password again. I didn't feel like looking it up so I skipped. It warned my with out re entering the password all the iservices weren't available. Also icloud couldn't back up. Hallejuh, just what I wanted, so no you can't get in.
Apple’s iPhone: the Backdoor Is Already There http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/02/22/apples-iphone-the-backdoor-is-already-there/print/ Might as well include this, since I think the perspective is somewhat similar: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11154443
I would be surprised if intelligence agencies did not have operatives inside the technology companies (Google, Apple, Samsung). Given their resources it is not a stretch.
High ground is an area of elevated terrain which can be useful in combat. The military importance of high ground has been recognized for over 2,000 years, for example in Sun Tzu's The Art of War, in which military leaders are advised to take high ground and let the enemy try to attack from a lower position. It has been awhile since I read The Art of War, but I think there are some other passages which would relate. I liked high ground because even animals learned to use it to their advantage.
