System Virginity Verifier 1.0 Finds Kernel Jump Hole

Discussion in 'other security issues & news' started by charlestek, Oct 22, 2005.

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  1. charlestek

    charlestek Registered Member

    Joined:
    Oct 22, 2005
    Posts:
    11
    Hi. I just tried the System Virginity Verifier cited from the Sunbelt Software Blog <URL: http://www.invisiblethings.org/tools.html >
    http://www.rootkit.com/newsread.php?newsid=357
    (Description below in asterisked section)
    and it warns me that I have a massive difference between kernel32.dll on disk and in memory on my WinXp Pro Sp2 System. I also have ZoneAlarm Pro on my system and Pivx's Pre-Empt. The log shows the Zonealarm vsdatant.sys driver, and says I have a bad problem in kernel32.dll. Can anyone offer an opinion as to whether this could a false positive, or do I need to panico_O
    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    module ntoskrnl.exe [0x80800000 - 0x80a14100]:
    0x8080403d [RtlPrefetchMemoryNonTemporal()+0] 1 byte(s): exclusion

    filter: single byte modification
    file :c3
    memory :90
    verdict = 1

    0x80804aa2 18 byte(s): exclusion filter: KeFlushCurrentTb()
    file :d8 0f 22 d8 c3 0f 20 e0 25 7f ff ff ff 0f 22 e0 0d 80
    memory :e0 25 7f ff ff ff 0f 22 e0 0d 80 00 00 00 0f 22 e0 c3
    verdict = 1

    0x80804aba 1 byte(s): exclusion filter: single byte modification
    file :c3
    memory :00
    verdict = 1

    0x808078ea 1 byte(s): exclusion filter: single byte modification
    file :05
    memory :06
    verdict = 1

    0x8080b724 [KiServiceTable[31]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96d01c0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :ad 24 8b 80
    memory :c0 01 6d b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b73c [KiServiceTable[37]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cd2d0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :48 9d 89 80
    memory :d0 d2 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b74c [KiServiceTable[41]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e5864 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :61 77 89 80
    memory :64 58 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b764 [KiServiceTable[47]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e4680 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :14 63 8d 80
    memory :80 46 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b768 [KiServiceTable[48]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e48a0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :1a 94 8a 80
    memory :a0 48 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b770 [KiServiceTable[50]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e7280 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :1b d4 88 80
    memory :80 72 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7a0 [KiServiceTable[62]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cd7b0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :07 cc 8f 80
    memory :b0 d7 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7a4 [KiServiceTable[63]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e5fb0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :78 9f 8b 80
    memory :b0 5f 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7ac [KiServiceTable[65]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e5d90 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :fa 79 8b 80
    memory :90 5d 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7b8 [KiServiceTable[68]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e3fc0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :b6 ca 89 80
    memory :c0 3f 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b82c [KiServiceTable[97]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cb380 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :ec 98 8c 80
    memory :80 b3 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b830 [KiServiceTable[98]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e6160 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :f0 3c 8d 80
    memory :60 61 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b858 [KiServiceTable[108]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e74e0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :fc c2 89 80
    memory :e0 74 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b878 [KiServiceTable[116]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cd5e0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :e3 9c 89 80
    memory :e0 d5 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b890 [KiServiceTable[122]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e3dc0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :96 cc 89 80
    memory :c0 3d 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b8a8 [KiServiceTable[128]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e3b90 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :74 19 8b 80
    memory :90 3b 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9ac [KiServiceTable[193]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e6420 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :32 62 97 80
    memory :20 64 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9c8 [KiServiceTable[200]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cfe90 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :ba fe 89 80
    memory :90 fe 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9d8 [KiServiceTable[204]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e66a0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :56 4d 97 80
    memory :a0 66 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9f0 [KiServiceTable[210]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96d0370 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :ca e9 8a 80
    memory :70 03 6d b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080ba28 [KiServiceTable[224]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cd920 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :2c 0e 8a 80
    memory :20 d9 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080ba68 [KiServiceTable[240]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cb1f0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :d6 7e 8c 80
    memory :f0 b1 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080ba84 [KiServiceTable[247]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e5b80 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :1d dc 89 80
    memory :80 5b 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080baac [KiServiceTable[257]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96e4ad0 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :2b bc 8a 80
    memory :d0 4a 6e b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080bac0 [KiServiceTable[262]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb96cb530 is inside vsdatant.sys module
    [0xb96b5000-0xb970e000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :54 14 94 80
    memory :30 b5 6c b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080bac4 [KiServiceTable[263]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xf7a1f63c is inside uphcleanhlp.sys module
    [0xf7a1f000-0xf7a21000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\uphcleanhlp.sys
    module file is NOT PRESENT!!!
    file :2b 50 97 80
    memory :3c f6 a1 f7
    verdict = 3

    module ntoskrnl.exe: end of details
    kernel32.dll (7c800000 - 7c8f4000)... suspected! (verdict = 5).
    module kernel32.dll [0x7c800000 - 0x7c8f4000]:
    0x7c801af1 [LoadLibraryExW()+0] 6 byte(s): JMPing code (jmp to:
    0x5f05001e)
    address 0x5f05001e DOES NOT belong to ANY MODULE!
    file :6a 34 68 88 e2 80
    memory :ff 25 1e 00 05 5f
    verdict = 5

    0x7c80aa7b [FreeLibrary()+15] 4 byte(s): SUSPECTED code
    modification:
    file :dc ff ff ff
    memory :bd 55 7f e2
    verdict = 5

    module kernel32.dll: end of details

    SYSTEM INFECTION LEVEL: 5
    0 - BLUE
    1 - GREEN
    2 - YELLOW
    3 - ORANGE
    4 - RED
    --> 5 - DEEPRED
    SUSPECTED modifications detected. System is probably infected!

    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

    The woman who wrote it describes it:
    ***************************************************************************************************************
    The idea behind SVV is to check important Windows System components, which are usually altered by various
    stealth malware, in order to ensure system integrity and to discovery potential system compromise.

    SVV 1.0 implements only code virginity verification which is the first step in SVV implementation and its task
    is to ensure the integrity of the code sections of in-memory mapped kernel and usermode modules (that is kernel
    drivers and usermode DLLs).

    Yes, there are dozens of ways to write a rootkit not detectable by SVV 1.0, because SVV 1.0 is not intended to
    be an ultimate solution - it's just a first step in building integrity based compromise detector. Next steps
    will involve IDT, SDT, IRP dispatch tables checking, etc...

    How SVV is different form VICE? SVV doesn’t look for a known patterns of infection as VICE does (JMP hooks)
    just ensures in-memory code integrity. VICE seems to generate lots of false positives, while SVV was designed to
    minimize the number of false positives. On the other hand, SVV 1.0 checks only code sections, while VICE is
    able to check also IAT/EAT, SDT and IRP dispatch tables.

    More details about SVV can be found in my recent HITB presentation:
    http://invisiblethings.org/papers/hitb05_virginity_verifier.ppt

    SVV 1.0 can be downloaded here:
    http://invisiblethings.org/tools/svv-1.0-public.zip
     
  2. charlestek

    charlestek Registered Member

    Joined:
    Oct 22, 2005
    Posts:
    11
    Well, on the advice of a security expert from criticalsites.com,
    I shut down the PreEmpt service, snoozed my antivirus, shutdown zonealarm,
    and killed my antispyware. Now I only get an error from the user hive profile cleaner that I know has a problem (uninstalling it removes this error)
    Here is the new log:

    verifying module: [ ntoskrnl.exe] 0%... -
    verifying module: [ hal.dll] 1%... \
    verifying module: [ KDCOM.DLL] 1%... |
    verifying module: [ BOOTVID.dll] 2%... /
    verifying module: [ ACPI.sys] 3%... -
    verifying module: [ WMILIB.SYS] 3%... \
    verifying module: [ pci.sys] 4%... |
    verifying module: [ isapnp.sys] 5%... /
    verifying module: [ viaide.sys] 5%... -
    verifying module: [ PCIIDEX.SYS] 6%... \
    verifying module: [ MountMgr.sys] 6%... |
    verifying module: [ ftdisk.sys] 7%... /
    verifying module: [ dmload.sys] 8%... -
    verifying module: [ dmio.sys] 8%... \
    verifying module: [ vIdeBus.sys] 9%... |
    verifying module: [ PartMgr.sys] 10%... /
    verifying module: [ VolSnap.sys] 10%... -
    verifying module: [ atapi.sys] 11%... \
    verifying module: [ si3112r.sys] 12%... |
    verifying module: [ SCSIPORT.SYS] 12%... /
    verifying module: [ hpt3xx.sys] 13%... -
    verifying module: [ vIdePort.sys] 13%... \
    verifying module: [ SiWinAcc.sys] 14%... |
    verifying module: [ disk.sys] 15%... /
    verifying module: [ CLASSPNP.SYS] 15%... -
    verifying module: [ fltmgr.sys] 16%... \
    verifying module: [ sr.sys] 17%... |
    verifying module: [ PxHelp20.sys] 17%... /
    verifying module: [ hptpro.sys] 18%... -
    verifying module: [ PQV2i.sys] 18%... \
    verifying module: [ KSecDD.sys] 19%... |
    verifying module: [ Defrag32b.sys] 20%... /
    verifying module: [ Ntfs.sys] 20%... -
    verifying module: [ NDIS.sys] 21%... \
    verifying module: [ viaagp1.sys] 22%... |
    verifying module: [ Mup.sys] 22%... /
    verifying module: [ amdk7.sys] 23%... -
    verifying module: [ nv4_mini.sys] 24%... \
    verifying module: [ VIDEOPRT.SYS] 24%... |
    verifying module: [ hercspud.sys] 25%... /
    verifying module: [ hercos.sys] 25%... -
    verifying module: [ ks.sys] 26%... \
    verifying module: [ winachcf.sys] 27%... |
    verifying module: [ Modem.SYS] 27%... /
    verifying module: [ usbuhci.sys] 28%... -
    verifying module: [ USBPORT.SYS] 29%... \
    verifying module: [ usbehci.sys] 29%... |
    verifying module: [ imapi.sys] 30%... /
    verifying module: [ cdrom.sys] 31%... -
    verifying module: [ redbook.sys] 31%... \
    verifying module: [ GearAspiWDM.SYS] 32%... |
    verifying module: [ fetnd5bv.sys] 32%... /
    verifying module: [ fdc.sys] 33%... -
    verifying module: [ serial.sys] 34%... \
    verifying module: [ serenum.sys] 34%... |
    verifying module: [ parport.sys] 35%... /
    verifying module: [ i8042prt.sys] 36%... -
    verifying module: [ L8042pr2.Sys] 36%... \
    verifying module: [ LMouFlt2.Sys] 37%... |
    verifying module: [ mouclass.sys] 37%... /
    verifying module: [ kbdclass.sys] 38%... -
    verifying module: [ audstub.sys] 39%... \
    verifying module: [ rasl2tp.sys] 39%... |
    verifying module: [ ndistapi.sys] 40%... /
    verifying module: [ ndiswan.sys] 41%... -
    verifying module: [ raspppoe.sys] 41%... \
    verifying module: [ raspptp.sys] 42%... |
    verifying module: [ TDI.SYS] 43%... /
    verifying module: [ ptilink.sys] 43%... -
    verifying module: [ raspti.sys] 44%... \
    verifying module: [ rdpdr.sys] 44%... |
    verifying module: [ termdd.sys] 45%... /
    verifying module: [ SetupSys.sys] 46%... -
    verifying module: [ swenum.sys] 46%... \
    verifying module: [ update.sys] 47%... |
    verifying module: [ mssmbios.sys] 48%... /
    verifying module: [ NDProxy.SYS] 48%... -
    verifying module: [ dmboot.sys] 49%... \
    verifying module: [ hercwdm.sys] 50%... |
    verifying module: [ portcls.sys] 50%... /
    verifying module: [ drmk.sys] 51%... -
    verifying module: [ gameenum.sys] 51%... \
    verifying module: [ MODEMCSA.sys] 52%... |
    verifying module: [ usbhub.sys] 53%... /
    verifying module: [ USBD.SYS] 53%... -
    verifying module: [ flpydisk.sys] 54%... \
    verifying module: [ VETFDDNT.SYS] 55%... |
    verifying module: [ Fs_Rec.SYS] 55%... /
    verifying module: [ VETEFILE.SYS] 56%... -
    verifying module: [ VET-REC.SYS] 56%... \
    verifying module: [ VET-FILT.SYS] 57%... |
    verifying module: [ VETMONNT.SYS] 58%... /
    verifying module: [ VETEBOOT.SYS] 58%... -
    verifying module: [ Null.SYS] 59%... \
    verifying module: [ Beep.SYS] 60%... |
    verifying module: [ HIDPARSE.SYS] 60%... /
    verifying module: [ vga.sys] 61%... -
    verifying module: [ mnmdd.SYS] 62%... \
    verifying module: [ RDPCDD.sys] 62%... |
    verifying module: [ Msfs.SYS] 63%... /
    verifying module: [ Npfs.SYS] 63%... -
    verifying module: [ rasacd.sys] 64%... \
    verifying module: [ ipsec.sys] 65%... |
    verifying module: [ msgpc.sys] 65%... /
    verifying module: [ tcpip.sys] 66%... -
    verifying module: [ netbt.sys] 67%... \
    verifying module: [ afd.sys] 67%... |
    verifying module: [ netbios.sys] 68%... /
    verifying module: [ rdbss.sys] 68%... -
    verifying module: [ PQNTDrv.SYS] 69%... \
    verifying module: [ PQIMount.SYS] 70%... |
    verifying module: [ mrxsmb.sys] 70%... /
    verifying module: [ Fips.SYS] 71%... -
    verifying module: [ atkkbnt.sys] 72%... \
    verifying module: [ ipnat.sys] 72%... |
    verifying module: [ wanarp.sys] 73%... /
    verifying module: [ usbprint.sys] 74%... -
    verifying module: [ Cdfs.SYS] 74%... \
    verifying module: [ win32k.sys] 75%... |
    verifying module: [ Dxapi.sys] 75%... /
    verifying module: [ watchdog.sys] 76%... -
    verifying module: [ dxg.sys] 77%... \
    verifying module: [ dxgthk.sys] 77%... |
    verifying module: [ nvcap.sys] 78%... /
    verifying module: [ STREAM.SYS] 79%... -
    verifying module: [ nvtvsnd.sys] 79%... \
    verifying module: [ NVxbar.sys] 80%... |
    verifying module: [ nvtunep.sys] 81%... /
    verifying module: [ atkdisp.dll] 81%... -
    verifying module: [ nv4_disp.dll] 82%... \
    verifying module: [ vsdatant.sys] 82%... |
    verifying module: [ OkiPar.SYS] 83%... /
    verifying module: [ ParVdm.SYS] 84%... -
    verifying module: [ Defrag32.SYS] 84%... \
    verifying module: [ EIO.sys] 85%... |
    verifying module: [ EPoXUSDM.SYS] 86%... /
    verifying module: [ mdmxsdk.sys] 86%... -
    verifying module: [ srv.sys] 87%... \
    verifying module: [ uphcleanhlp.sys] 87%... |
    verifying module: [ wdmaud.sys] 88%... /
    verifying module: [ sysaudio.sys] 89%... -
    verifying module: [ ATMFD.DLL] 89%... \
    verifying module: [ kmixer.sys] 90%... |
    verifying module: [ svv.sys] 91%... /
    verifying module: [ ntdll.dll] 91%... -
    verifying module: [ svv.exe] 92%... \
    verifying module: [ ntdll.dll] 93%... |
    verifying module: [ kernel32.dll] 93%... /
    verifying module: [ PSAPI.DLL] 94%... -
    verifying module: [ WS2_32.dll] 94%... \
    verifying module: [ msvcrt.dll] 95%... |
    verifying module: [ WS2HELP.dll] 96%... /
    verifying module: [ ADVAPI32.dll] 96%... -
    verifying module: [ RPCRT4.dll] 97%... \
    verifying module: [ USER32.dll] 98%... |
    verifying module: [ GDI32.dll] 98%... /
    verifying module: [ LPK.DLL] 99%... -
    verifying module: [ USP10.dll] 100%... \

    ntoskrnl.exe (80800000 - 80a14100)... innocent hooking (verdict = 3).
    module ntoskrnl.exe [0x80800000 - 0x80a14100]:
    0x8080403d [RtlPrefetchMemoryNonTemporal()+0] 1 byte(s): exclusion filter: single byte modification
    file :c3
    memory :90
    verdict = 1

    0x80804aa2 18 byte(s): exclusion filter: KeFlushCurrentTb()
    file :d8 0f 22 d8 c3 0f 20 e0 25 7f ff ff ff 0f 22 e0 0d 80
    memory :e0 25 7f ff ff ff 0f 22 e0 0d 80 00 00 00 0f 22 e0 c3
    verdict = 1

    0x80804aba 1 byte(s): exclusion filter: single byte modification
    file :c3
    memory :00
    verdict = 1

    0x808078ea 1 byte(s): exclusion filter: single byte modification
    file :05
    memory :06
    verdict = 1

    0x8080b73c [KiServiceTable[37]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bd52d0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :48 9d 89 80
    memory :d0 52 bd b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b74c [KiServiceTable[41]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bed864 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :61 77 89 80
    memory :64 d8 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b764 [KiServiceTable[47]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bec680 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :14 63 8d 80
    memory :80 c6 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b768 [KiServiceTable[48]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bec8a0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :1a 94 8a 80
    memory :a0 c8 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b770 [KiServiceTable[50]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bef280 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :1b d4 88 80
    memory :80 f2 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7a0 [KiServiceTable[62]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bd57b0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :07 cc 8f 80
    memory :b0 57 bd b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7a4 [KiServiceTable[63]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bedfb0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :78 9f 8b 80
    memory :b0 df be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7ac [KiServiceTable[65]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bedd90 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :fa 79 8b 80
    memory :90 dd be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b7b8 [KiServiceTable[68]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bebfc0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :b6 ca 89 80
    memory :c0 bf be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b830 [KiServiceTable[98]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bee160 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :f0 3c 8d 80
    memory :60 e1 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b878 [KiServiceTable[116]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bd55e0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :e3 9c 89 80
    memory :e0 55 bd b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b890 [KiServiceTable[122]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bebdc0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :96 cc 89 80
    memory :c0 bd be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b8a8 [KiServiceTable[128]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bebb90 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :74 19 8b 80
    memory :90 bb be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9ac [KiServiceTable[193]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bee420 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :32 62 97 80
    memory :20 e4 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9d8 [KiServiceTable[204]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bee6a0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :56 4d 97 80
    memory :a0 e6 be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080b9f0 [KiServiceTable[210]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bd8370 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :ca e9 8a 80
    memory :70 83 bd b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080ba28 [KiServiceTable[224]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bd5920 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :2c 0e 8a 80
    memory :20 59 bd b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080ba84 [KiServiceTable[247]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9bedb80 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :1d dc 89 80
    memory :80 db be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080baac [KiServiceTable[257]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xb9becad0 is inside vsdatant.sys module [0xb9bbd000-0xb9c16000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\vsdatant.sys
    file :2b bc 8a 80
    memory :d0 ca be b9
    verdict = 2

    0x8080bac4 [KiServiceTable[263]] 4 byte(s): KiServiceTable HOOK:
    address 0xf057163c is inside uphcleanhlp.sys module [0xf0571000-0xf0573000]
    target module path: \??\C:\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\uphcleanhlp.sys
    module file is NOT PRESENT!!!
    file :2b 50 97 80
    memory :3c 16 57 f0
    verdict = 3

    module ntoskrnl.exe: end of details

    SYSTEM INFECTION LEVEL: 3
    0 - BLUE
    1 - GREEN
    2 - YELLOW
    --> 3 - ORANGE
    4 - RED
    5 - DEEPRED
    Some hooking detected but it is probably caused by some tracing tools,
    like SysInternals' RegMon or DbgView.
    Stop all those tools and rerun the tests.
     
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