MD5 flaw threatens file integrity

Discussion in 'other security issues & news' started by Starrob, Dec 9, 2004.

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  1. Starrob

    Starrob Registered Member

    Apr 14, 2004
  2. FanJ

    FanJ Guest

    Sure interesting, no doubt !!! I (and Joseph !!!!!) pointed at the NISFileCheck-guidelines (now in the forum archive) that the MD5-HASH algorithm is crackable....
    here reply 7
  3. rerun2

    rerun2 Registered Member

    Aug 27, 2003
    Is this the same MD5 collision attack that was widely talked about in August/September? This is an article by Bruce Schneier on his thoughts about this attack at the time.

    "Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA

    At the CRYPTO conference in Santa Barbara, CA, last month, researchers announced several weaknesses in common hash functions. These results, while mathematically significant, aren't cause for alarm. But even so, it's probably time for the cryptography community to get together and create a new hash standard.

    One-way hash functions are a cryptographic construct used in many applications. They are used in conjunction with public-key algorithms for both encryption and digital signatures. They are used in integrity checking. They are used in authentication. They have all sorts of applications in a great many different protocols. Much more than encryption algorithms, one-way hash functions are the workhorses of modern cryptography.

    In 1990, Ron Rivest invented the hash function MD4. In 1992, he improved on MD4 and developed another hash function: MD5. In 1993, the National Security Agency published a hash function very similar to MD5, called SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm). Then, in 1995, citing a newly discovered weakness that it refused to elaborate on, the NSA made a change to SHA. The new algorithm was called SHA-1. Today, the most popular hash function is SHA-1, with MD5 still being used in older applications.

    One-way hash functions are supposed to have two properties. One, they're one way. This means that it is easy to take a message and compute the hash value, but it's impossible to take a hash value and recreate the original message. (By "impossible" I mean "can't be done in any reasonable amount of time.") Two, they're collision free. This means that it is impossible to find two messages that hash to the same hash value. The cryptographic reasoning behind these two properties is subtle, and I invite curious readers to learn more in my book "Applied Cryptography."

    Breaking a hash function means showing that either -- or both -- of those properties are not true. Cryptanalysis of the MD4 family of hash functions has proceeded in fits and starts over the last decade or so, with results against simplified versions of the algorithms and partial results against the whole algorithms. This year, Eli Biham and Rafi Chen, and separately Antoine Joux, announced some pretty impressive cryptographic results against MD5 and SHA. Collisions have been demonstrated in SHA. And there are rumors, unconfirmed at this writing, of results against SHA-1.

    The magnitude of these results depends on who you are. If you're a cryptographer, this is a huge deal. While not revolutionary, these results are substantial advances in the field. The techniques described by the researchers are likely to have other applications, and we'll be better able to design secure systems as a result. This is how the science of cryptography advances: we learn how to design new algorithms by breaking other algorithms. Additionally, algorithms from the NSA are considered a sort of alien technology: they come from a superior race with no explanations. Any successful cryptanalysis against an NSA algorithm is an interesting data point in the eternal question of how good they really are in there.

    To a user of cryptographic systems -- as I assume most readers are -- this news is important, but not particularly worrisome. MD5 and SHA aren't suddenly insecure. No one is going to be breaking digital signatures or reading encrypted messages anytime soon with these techniques. The electronic world is no less secure after these announcements than it was before.

    But there's an old saying inside the NSA: "Attacks always get better; they never get worse." These techniques will continue to improve, and probably someday there will be practical attacks based on these techniques.

    It's time for us all to migrate away from SHA-1.

    Luckily, there are alternatives. The National Institute of Standards and Technology already has standards for longer -- and harder to break -- hash functions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. They're already government standards, and can already be used. This is a good stopgap, but I'd like to see more.

    I'd like to see NIST orchestrate a worldwide competition for a new hash function, like they did for the new encryption algorithm, AES, to replace DES. NIST should issue a call for algorithms, and conduct a series of analysis rounds, where the community analyzes the various proposals with the intent of establishing a new standard.

    Most of the hash functions we have, and all the ones in widespread use, are based on the general principles of MD4. Clearly we've learned a lot about hash functions in the past decade, and I think we can start applying that knowledge to create something even more secure.

    Better to do it now, when there's no reason to panic, than years from now, when there might be."

    also posted at on August 19th, 2004
  4. FanJ

    FanJ Guest

    CryptoGram from Bruce is definitely always an interesting reading !!! :)

    You can subscribe to it and will receive it monthly by email.
  5. FanJ

    FanJ Guest

    Oh BTW, maybe I would be more worried about how secure your programs that are using checksums, save those checksums....

    But I have posted already about that several years ago, so I'd better leave it to that (or how you say that in good English).
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