While that's true according to the rules of logic, I would hope that at least people here would be aware that courts do not always operate under logic. So I said before, it's going to depend on the court. In the Fricosu case for example, that was one of the major defense arguments...the feds didn't even have file names or file references to go from. Virtually everything was speculation. They were investigating a case of alleged real estate fraud and seized her machines, on the chance that evidence pertaining to the case existed on the drives. That was all it took: She was a suspect in the case, they got a warrant to search a house, they took the computers thinking they'd get some incriminating evidence, at least one of the devices turned out to be encrypted with PGP Desktop, and the courts ruled Fricosu was to be compelled to decrypt them so that any evidence discovered could be used against her for prosecution. The feds had absolutely zero proof of that any data at all was on the device...let alone any sort of evidence pertaining to the case they had a warrant for. They couldn't even verifiably prove she owned the laptop nor that she could even access the data. The most they had was suspicion based on (at best) circumstantial evidence and a cryptic recorded jailhouse conversation between her and a co-defendant. None of that mattered. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/201...n-force-defendant-to-unlock-encrypted-laptop/ Yes, one would think the term "foregone conclusion" would refer to actual proof of what was on the drive (for example, in the Boucher case, the facts were stated that the laptop was already powered on during a border crossing stop and incriminating evidence was visible and indeed seen by border agents before the device was shut down and locked.) In that case, it's obvious that it was already known there was incriminating evidence on the device (they literally saw it), so decrypting it would not remove any presumption of innocence. That is obviously what a "foregone conclusion" is in the literal sense. But of course, in the "legal sense," it can mean whatever the court wants it to mean. That has been my point all along. They really can just go on a fishing expedition. Even in the US. I must admit I too am confused by your preoccupation with TrueCrypt. The software used is irrelevant...irrelevant in regard to the OP's question, and irrelevant in the view of (at least US) courts. It did not matter that the device in the Fricosu case was encrypted with PGP Desktop. It's not as if a court would say "Oh you didn't use TrueCrypt? Nevermind then." Perhaps some foreign court cares what software is used, and will for some reason let a defendant go if it can't be determined what software was used to produce encrypted volumes. That makes absolutely no sense, and sounds completely insane, but I do realize we're talking about the government/legal system, so there really is no such thing. The real determining factor in the 11th Circuit John Doe case was that they could not prove the devices were his or that he had the ability to decrypt them, and the court ruled that ordering him to do so would put him in exactly the kind of conundrum that the 5th Amendment was designed to prevent. The fact that they could not prove there was any data at all on the device (which the judge did bring up) was more secondary. And again, evidently, despite having a very similar situation/set of facts, the court in the Fricosu case ruled the opposite. The judge in that case even admitted they couldn't prove the device was hers. He literally said: "it is more likely than not that the computer belonged to and was used by Ms. Fricosu. Accordingly, I find and conclude that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by requiring production of the unencrypted contents of the Toshiba Satellite M305 laptop computer." So again, logic and proof are not a requirement in US courts. So I'll reiterate: If mere speculation is enough for a court to rule a suspect be compelled to decrypt a device, then all of the above arguments in this thread are largely moot. Speculation that the drive belongs to/was used by the suspect, speculation that the suspect can decrypt the device, and speculation that there is even any data on the device. That was all that was needed for the court to rule to force Ramona Fricosu to decrypt a laptop. So as I said, if they have file paths or references or fragments, or any of the other kind of information like what is cautioned against in the TC documentation, I'd say it would be that much easier to get such a ruling. Once again, plausible deniability (as in a decoy volume) is the only viable defense.