Escudo - Fine-Grained Protection Model for Web Browsers

m00nbl00d · Dec 7, 2011

[...]web applications have become attractive targets of exploitation. Cross-site scripting attacks are an example of untrusted principals exercising control over trusted objects inside the web browser, and cross-site-req uest forgeries are an example of unintended interference between principals and objects across applic ations. We argue that this disconnection between the protection needs of modern web applications and the protection models used by web browsers that manage those applications amounts to a failure of access control. To bridge this gap, we need an access control mechanism with three characteristics: (1) principal identification at a finer granularity that that offered by the URL of origin, (2) enforcement of the princi- ple of least privilege on all interactions between principa ls and objects, and (3) appropriate isolation of principals and objects to avoid unintended interference.
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Link: -http://academic.research.microsoft.com/Publication/5080569/escudo-a-fine-grained-protection-model-for-web-browsers

Paper: -http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/Research/paper/icdcs2010_escudo.pdf

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Escudo - Fine-Grained Protection Model for Web Browsers

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Escudo - Fine-Grained Protection Model for Web Browsers

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