1. They admit themselves they can do a live trace. 2. If you connect to a server with Xerobank it will know you connected with Xerobank. 3. If the people running the server force Xerobank to do live traces of activity to the server (which they can do if they are LE, don't fool yourself Steve) then they can find you the next time you go to the server. 4. Doing the same thing against Tor would be a lot harder because it is so much bigger and more distributed. 5. Even though Tor offers better anonymity than Xerobank, Steve bashes it constantly while advertising his own service as superior anonymity. 6. Steve throws out big words and acts like he gave an explanation, but if you know a thing or two about anonymity networks at a more advanced level you might notice that a lot of what Steve says is incorrect. Often times he likes to reinterpret questions to be different than they really are and then gives a true answer to the question he pretends was asked. Making sure to throw in enough technical words that no one will really understand what he is saying or that he totally (intentionally) misinterpreted the question being asked in the first place. 7. He plays up small short comings in Tor and makes it sound like Xerobank fixes the problems. Steve, Xerobank owning all exit nodes does not make it any less likely that someone is sniffing information on them. Maybe it makes it less likely they are credit card stealers, but it does not fix the underlying issue. Instead of trusting a random person running a Tor node you are trusting Xerobank that is the only real difference. And I would even go as far as to say Xerobank is more likely to be forced to cooperate with government eavesdropping than a random person running an exit node on tor is.