Security flaw Gopher in IE

Thanks Marianna

About those links:
Sometimes when you post a link and after that you go with your mouse over it, only a part of the link will be red: that is clickable. To make the whole link clickable put (url) just before it and (/url) just behind; replace ( with [ and ) with ]
Another way of doing it is:
when you post a message or a reply, look at that row of pictures right above that row with all these smilies. When you click on the second picture it gives you those same url-tags, and then place your url between them.
If you want to see how it looks like: do as if you want to modify that posting with the urls in it and see how it looks like.
Hihi, I hope you understand what I was writing

Yep, back to my Gopher problem.
Vaguelly I remember a posting at DSLR-security about ADSL-connection with respect to the Gopher-issue (the kind of connection I am on).

 

Hi Jan,

thanks for the explanation

I found the link regarding Gopher in DLSR -

http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,3473369~root=security,1~mode=flat

If I got the link correct inserted, I "got it"

 

Hi Marianna,

Yes, the link works fine Thanks !
I will have a look.....

 

Just got this warning from Kaspersky:

[hr]

Internet Explorer Exposed By Gopher Client Vulnerability
A buffer overflow in Microsoft Internet Explorer's Gopher client can be
caused by an attack from a link on a specially designed Web page or
through a link in e-mail. Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can
execute code on systems running Internet Explorer 5.5 and 6.

Microsoft knows of the problem but as of yet no software solution is
available. In the meantime, Oy Online Solutions, the Finnish company
that exposed this vulnerability suggests a workaround, which is outline
below.

Although the Gopher protocol so its popularity wane over the years, it
is supported by recent versions of Internet Explorer. Developed in the
early 1990s by the University of Minnesota (The Gophers), the Gopher
protocol allows users to connect to directories and files available on
Gopher servers. Like HTTP, Gopher pages can be accessed by starting the
desired address with Gopher://.

Details of the buffer overflow are not available. Microsoft is now
working on a fix.

Prevention Stept To Take: Oy Online Solutions suggests that users of
Internet Explorer 5.5 and 6 disable the Gopher protocol within the
browser. One solution is to create a Gopher proxy in Internet Options
located under Tools on the status bar.

- From Tools > Internet Options > Connections, select LAN Settings.
- Check "Use a proxy server for your LAN."
- Click Advanced and define the Gopher text field as localhost and type
1 in the port text field.
- Click OK to save and exit.

For modem users not on a LAN, the Gopher proxy settings
are located under Tools > Internet Options > Connections, then under
Dialup Settings select Settings.

Click on the following url to read the Microsoft Security Bulletin:
http://clickthru.online.com/Click?q=3b-XhmVINdhJzIpE2cFWZZD8pcUcsRR

 

Jan,

"you just got" the Kapersky warning??

Have a look here:

http://www.pressreleasenetwork.com/pr-2002/june/mainpr1298.htm

is dated June 11th, 2002 .

Hope this helps

 

Just got this from Microsoft in an e-mail:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Unchecked Buffer in Gopher Protocol Handler Can Run Code
of Attacker's Choice (Q323889)
Released: 11 June 2002
Revised: 14 June 2002 (version 2.0)
Software: Internet Explorer, Proxy Server, Internet Security and
Acceleration Server
Impact: Run Code of Attacker's Choice
Max Risk: Critical
Bulletin: MS02-027

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-027.asp.
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Reason for Revision:
====================
On June 11, 2002, Microsoft released the original version of this
bulletin. In it, we detailed a work-around procedure that customers
could implement to protect themselves against a publicly disclosed
vulnerability. An updated version of this bulletin was rereleased
on June 14, 2002 to announce the availability of patches for
Proxy Server 2.0 and ISA Server 2000 and to advise customers that
the work-around procedure is no longer needed on those platforms.
Patches for IE are forthcoming and this bulletin will be
re-released to announce their availability.

Issue:
======
This is a work-around bulletin that details steps customers can
take to protect themselves against a publicly disclosed
vulnerability until patches are available.

The Gopher protocol is a legacy protocol that provides for the
transfer of text-based information across the Internet.
Information on Gopher servers is hierarchically presented using a
menu system, and multiple Gopher servers can be linked together to
form a collective "Gopherspace".

There is an unchecked buffer in a piece of code which handles the
response from Gopher servers. This code is used independently in
IE, ISA, and Proxy Server. A security vulnerability results
because it is possible for an attacker to attempt to exploit this
flaw by mounting a buffer overrun attack through a specially
crafted server response. The attacker could seek to exploit the
vulnerability by crafting a web page that contacted a server
under the attacker's control. The attacker could then either post
this page on a web site or send it as an HTML email. When the page
was displayed and the server's response received and processed,
the attack would be carried out.

A successful attack requires that the attacker be able to send
information to the intended target using the Gopher protocol.
Anything which inhibited Gopher connectivity could protect against
attempts to exploit this vulnerability. In the case of IE, the
code would be run in the user's context. As a result, any
limitations on the user would apply to the attacker's code
as well.


Mitigating Factors:
====================
- A successful attack requires that the attacker's server be
able to deliver information to the target using the Gopher
protocol. Customers who block Gopher at the perimeter would be
protected against attempts to exploit this vulnerability across
the Internet.

- In the case of IE, code would run in the security context of
the user. As a result, any limitations on the user's ability
would also restrict the actions an attacker's code could take.

- A successful attack against ISA and Proxy servers would
require that the malicious response be received by the web
proxy service. In practical terms, this means that a proxy
client would have to submit the initial request through the
proxy server.

Risk Rating:
============
- Internet systems: Critical
- Intranet systems: Critical
- Client systems: Critical

Patch Availability:
===================
- A patch is currently under development to fix this
vulnerability. Please read the Security Bulletin at
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-027.asp
for workaround information while patches are developed.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS
PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS
ALL
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
IN NO EVENT
SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
LOSS OF
BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR
ITS
SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME
STATES DO
NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL
OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

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