REVISED: Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-030: Unchecked Buffer in DirectX

Discussion in 'other security issues & news' started by discogail, Aug 20, 2003.

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  1. discogail

    discogail Security Expert

    Joined:
    Feb 9, 2002
    Posts:
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    Title: Unchecked Buffer in DirectX Could Enable System
    Compromise (819696)
    Released: 23 July 2003
    Revised: 20 August 2003 (version 2.0)

    Software: Microsoft DirectX(r) 5.2 on Windows 98
    Microsoft DirectX 6.1 on Windows 98 SE
    Microsoft DirectX 7.1 on Windows Millennium Edition
    Microsoft DirectX 7.0 on Windows 2000
    Microsoft DirectX 8.0, 8.0a, 8.1, 8.1a, and 8.1b when
    installed on Windows 98, Windows 98 SE, Windows
    Millennium Edition or Windows 2000
    Microsoft DirectX 8.1 on Windows XP or
    Windows Server 2003
    Microsoft DirectX 9.0a when installed on Windows 98,
    Windows 98 SE, Windows Millennium Edition (Windows Me),
    Windows 2000, Windows XP, or Windows Server 2003
    Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Server with either Windows
    Media Player 6.4 or Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1
    installed.
    Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, Terminal Server Edition with
    either Windows Media Player 6.4 or Internet Explorer 6
    Service Pack 1 installed.

    Impact: Allow an attacker to execute code on a user's system
    Max Risk: Critical
    Bulletin: MS03-030

    Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-030.asp
    http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-030.asp
    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Reason for Revision:
    ====================
    Subsequent to the original release of this bulletin, customers
    requested that we support additional versions of DirectX that were
    not covered by the original patches. This bulletin has been updated
    to provide information about this new patch.


    Issue:
    ======
    DirectX consists of a set of low-level Application Programming
    Interfaces (APIs) that are used by Windows programs for multimedia
    support. Within DirectX, the DirectShow technology performs client-
    side audio and video sourcing, manipulation, and rendering.
    There are two buffer overruns with identical effects in the
    function used by DirectShow to check parameters in a Musical
    Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI) file. A security vulnerability
    results because it could be possible for a malicious user to
    attempt to exploit these flaws and execute code in the security
    context of the logged-on user.

    An attacker could seek to exploit this vulnerability by creating a
    specially crafted MIDI file designed to exploit this vulnerability
    and then host it on a Web site or on a network share, or send it by
    using an HTML-based e-mail. In the case where the file was hosted
    on a Web site or network share, the user would need to open the
    specially crafted file. If the file was embedded in a page the
    vulnerability could be exploited when a user visited the Web page.
    In the HTML-based e-mail case, the vulnerability could be exploited
    when a user opened or previewed the HTML-based e-mail. A successful
    attack could cause DirectShow, or an application making use of
    DirectShow, to fail. A successful attack could also cause an
    attacker's code to run on the user's computer in the security
    context of the user.

    Mitigating Factors:
    ====================
    - - By default, Internet Explorer on Windows Server 2003 runs in
    Enhanced Security Configuration. This default configuration of
    Internet Explorer blocks the e-mail-based vector of this attack
    because Microsoft Outlook Express running on Windows Server 2003 by
    default reads e-mail in plain text. If Internet Explorer Enhanced
    Security Configuration were disabled, the protections put in place
    that prevent this vulnerability from being exploited would be
    removed.
    - - In the Web-based attack scenario, the attacker would have to host
    a Web site that contained a Web page used to exploit these
    vulnerabilities. An attacker would have no way to force users to
    visit a malicious Web site outside the HTML-based e-mail vector.
    Instead, the attacker would need to lure them there, typically by
    getting them to click a link that would take them to the attacker's
    site.
    - - The combination of the above means that on Windows Server 2003 an
    administrator browsing only to trusted sites should be safe from
    this vulnerability.
    - - Code executed on the system would only run under the privileges
    of the logged-on user.

    Risk Rating:
    ============
    - - Critical

    Patch Availability:
    ===================
    - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
    Security Bulletins at
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-030.asp
    http://www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/MS03-30.asp
    for information on obtaining this patch.

    Acknowledgment:
    ===============
    - - eEye Digital Security, http://www.eeye.com
     
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