I received an email on several of my protonmail accounts. Many things were discussed but I wanted to highlight that Protonmail is closing in on hardware authentication. Nothing compares to true U2F! I know they are working on it in fervor. Paste from email body: What's next? We have many major features planned for this year such as adding contact groups, support for hardware two-factor authentication, and improving interoperability with non-ProtonMail PGP users. ProtonMail is community-supported, so if you would like to support our mission and help us build features faster, please consider upgrading to a paid account or making a donation.
Huzzah! Hopefully, the implementation will give the user full control of any recovery mechanisms, so that, for instance, you can register 2 u2f keys, and that's that. One of the weaknesses of these strong schemes is that many organisations provide a recovery mechanism that can be triggered by the bad guy, defaulting to weak 2fa including sms or email.
Fortunately even with those systems where they do NOT allow for two U2F keys, many next best systems will allow for a paper backup code list as the replacement for the second U2F chip. I do that with some gmail accounts. Should I lose or break my U2F chip only the paper backup codes will work as the replacement. SMS or email as second backup defeats the entire mission of U2F. I don't mind the printed backup codes. I could use two chips as well but for now I am using backup codes on some accounts. I am getting to the point where I hate regular (user + password only) sign in security. It would not break my heart to have U2F here as a for instance.
In the days of Meltdown/Spectre I think it's irresponsible and negligent for any website hosting sensitive data/financial transactions NOT to have 2FA. So indeed, these sites using password-only ought to be illegal. To be fair to website operators, the tools and setup of a robust two factor account management solution with decent recovery and alerting are not easy or cheap. Hopefully there will be more commercial solutions/services for that shortly - I think the better examples like gmail offer a reasonable paradigm. Paper codes are fine for me too, since the main threat is a remote one, I think. If an assailant literally has your paper codes, they may have you or your loved ones, in which case I'd sing like a canary! If they haven't got you as well, the bit of paper is not going to be very helpful to them. I guess we are all developing passwords peeves, mine include pathetic password strength meters (long-strong diceware passwords are considered weak because lower-case & digits only), bizarre constraints on what you can or can't have in terms of characters, ridiculous memorable questions and security questions, email & SMS 2FA or recovery mechanisms, smartphone authentication mechanisms, lack of configuration options and destinations for alerts, inability to set transaction limits on accounts, it goes on. An area I'm trying the think through right now is the correct approach to secure access and data in the face of travelling, hostile customs or crooks. Potentially U2F isn't as good as say OTP or HMAC secrets, because potentially you can wipe those before travelling and then recover them afterwards and reprogram the key - which isn't possible with U2F.
A thought on your concerns: there is nothing to link the U2F chip to any particular site ON the chip itself. If a customs agent (example) has your U2F chip in his hand he has no idea which sites are unlocked by that key, or why you are actually carrying it. Maybe you could have a couple of generic no security needed sites with that key as the authentication device to "connect" for the customs agent if needed. Of course the other piece would be to have no visible link to the "security needed" (U2F only) sites on your computer while traveling. Or possibly an encrypted virtual volume on the disk that would only unlock using the U2F, that being the justification for carrying the physical key itself. Seems like this would be a somewhat acceptable/believable approach. My thoughts without much time given to deep reflection.
@Palancar - indeed, not easy, and I'd welcome thoughts you have as we cogitate. I think you're right with being able to offer anodyne logins with U2F if required, rather than absolute refusal, although potentially you're at risk because you have lied by omission. Maybe you forgot, you have so many. That's similar to being able to offer to run a viable OS and opening an anodyne account on it. Perhaps the best approach as ever is to have no tech with you at all, but this is a ridiculous situation, made worse by the unprincipled behavior of the authorities. On that score, I'm fuming because many UK police forces think its too much trouble ("not practical") to get a warrant to search a mobile phone (from arrested persons or witnesses), nor do they have any/decent policies regarding use of the data, reporting on it, sanctions for abuse etc. That extends the customs nightmare into wherever you live in the UK. The reality we live in appears to be a steady erosion of law both internationally and domestically (can't be bothered with MLAT, can't be bothered with warrants or evidence or custody of data etc). Caveat Emptor and hooray for our Leaders!
They are among what I requested in annual survey, as well as open sourcing mobile apps ASAP and allowing user to manage their key. I was uncertain how many ppl requested such thing after seeing their forum, but okay they seem to hear user voice, which is good!
