Discussion in 'privacy general' started by RockLobster, Mar 12, 2018.
I wonder if Mirimir is on such lists. Anyone who has ever posted about Tor? Who reads The Intercept?
But the key thing, I'm pretty sure, is that my meatspace identity is not on such lists. Unless they include all VPN users, which seems unlikely.
I think its a good thing to be on it, in the spirit of people like Alex Jones, Steve Piecezenik, Bruce Schneier and many others who wont be intimidated into silent acceptance by the threat of surveillance like the millions of sorry *** ******* that are.
There is no incentive to keep information accurate in any sense, because there is no redress for harm for the individuals. The current law of standing is disastrous when it comes to this class of B2B information, because there is no context to even be aware of the existence of the information, let alone being able to challenge it and seek damages for careless and negligent statements in it. And the parties in the B2B transaction don't care much if the information is 20% inaccurate.
I'm not even sure that the information would be covered by things like the GPDR because of the lack of standing in the transaction.
For a long while, there was a blacklist of contractors for the building trade in the UK which the majors subscribed to, managed by a private company. Took many years and ruined careers before that became uncovered and stopped.
Even more insidious, in my opinion, is the amalgamation of rating systems for things of this sort, where you kind-of have a "credit rating" for various risks, not just financial ones. These would be algorithmically constructed with no basis and no oversight and checking - completely opaque and even harder to challenge.
Yes, like hiring blacklists.
I wonder whether the Right to Be Forgotten applies to such lists.
There is now a report finding that UK Police were involved in providing information to unlawful blacklists used by employers to vet candidates.
The problem that will escape none here, is that with the indiscriminate "legal" access provided to bulk datasets on individuals - to the police and a myriad of other organisations, this type of abuse is even easier to achieve, and extremely hard to nail. For example, trade union leaders and activists are likely already automatically "suspects" and subject to additional scrutiny and selector marking. It would take no big leap to exfiltrate that data in some way, particularly since the number of security policy boundaries is so extensive due to the number of individuals and organisations with access, and clearly lax.
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