Supply chain compromise: Adding undetectable hardware Trojans to integrated circuits

guest · Dec 10, 2018

Supply chain compromise: Adding undetectable hardware Trojans to integrated circuits
December 10, 2018
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/12/10/hardware-trojans/

Is it possible for attackers to equip integrated circuits with hardware Trojans that will not change the area or power consumption of the IC, making them thus indiscernible through power-based post fabrication analysis?

They have also demonstrated that hardware Trojans (HTs) can be implanted not only by adding logical gates to the original circuit, but also by identifying and safely removing expendable, redundant gates and embedding malicious circuitry at the appropriate locations.
The TrojanZero approach
“In the proposed attack model, we assume that the attacker resides at the foundry where she can modify the circuit in the form of addition, deletion or modification of the gates during fabrication,” the researchers explained.

“An attacker with a reasonable knowledge of circuit configuration can circumvent its security with potentially no risk of getting detected. This instigates a need of exploring more sophisticated and viable techniques for the post-silicon detection of HTs,” they concluded.
Click to expand...

"TrojanZero: Switching Activity-Aware Design of Undetectable Hardware Trojans with Zero Power and Area Footprint" (PDF): https://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.02770.pdf

mirimir · Dec 11, 2018

Damn. But it does make sense.

So yeah, buy your hardware anonymously. And compartmentalize at the hardware level.

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Supply chain compromise: Adding undetectable hardware Trojans to integrated circuits

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