What is your privacy setup like?

I'd be interested in hearing about this setup. Have you recompiled TC with customizations?

PD

 

Same here, especially with the "self-destruct" options

~h

 

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I'm not using TC but I can only reveal it's one of the rarest commercial FDEs with preboot password destruction.

About the preboot password destruction:
If your attacker tries to bruteforce it with dictionary attack, it will kill off the hidden OS access.

About the startup hidden partition destroyer mechanism, this is easy on my setup (inside decoy OS):
■ Be sure to put tons of pictures of beautiful ladies/men to trick your attacker into thinking this is your dirty secret OS.
■ I've tweaked a whole range of registry settings; disabling, functions, taskbar, start button menus, task manager etc, desktop icons, drives, safe mode, etc.
■ Plant several zip bombs on startup, hide command popups.

Remember that the hidden OS is located inside decoy OS with "only few MBs of buffer".
When someone logs into Decoy OS, it is 100% chance the encrypted hidden OS will be overwritten at least partiallly rendering your secrets unrecoverable.

About the system crash mechanism hotkey, I use Bestcrypt Volume Encryption extra feature. You can assign your own hotkey to crash (blue screen of death) instantly.

The only weakness to current FDE is cold boot attack, which has maximum 5 minutes window after your computer shuts down.
In layman terms, your attacker needs to raid your place and spray (eg. liquid nitrogen) freeze your physical RAM within 5 minutes after your computer has been switched off. Make sure sure it's NOT attached to battery (if laptop) or UPS (if desktop).

 

Cold boot protection on my laptop
(Note: This removes all warranty)

 

So I'll assume it's DCPP and you also run BCVE for the 'Crash' Command? Does that 'Crash' option also wipe DCPP's keys? I assume you don't encrypt anything with BCVE since DCPP is doing it all?

PD

 

JBWeld is a wonderful product

PD

 

How to Protect Your Online Privacy

 

can already imagine the pain in the ~ Snipped as per TOS ~ replacing ram will be with this , nice idea thou , something to consider

 

I've found a group of people as paranoid as I seem to be

~h

 

i almost forgot one thing theres something in dev once this gets integrated with TC coldboot attacks will be a thing of the past and no jb weld required

that would be TRESOR

 

Before your attacker does anything, they're going to clone the drive. How do you feel software FDE with any kind of "self-destruct after X number of attempts" will protect you at all?

Am I missing something?

-

 

Actually, I can see this as a useful tool (I know it's a hot button topic in the FDE community). There is one real world incident where, if the detainee really had some data he wanted destroyed, it could have helped him. The individual was Kevin Mitnick:

http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10054569-83.html

He goes into a lot more detail on TWiT a few weeks later. IIRC there were some times where they asked for his password, or had him log into other devices. A destruction password would have worked wonderfully. Our potential adversaries aren't all MENSA candidates, and all scenarios aren't 'no knock' raids where you never get to touch your gear again.

PD

 

hence the reason why it hasnt been included in the first place from the TC devs, it is indeed kind of useless against no knock raids , a strong passphrase with fde and thats all you need , then comes jbweld or TRESOR once its ready, and make sure you have a motion detector activated for when your not at home that cuts off your electricity from your pc and hdds