Anatomy of a Real World Attack with Application Reputation

Decided to read a bit of this topic. Nice to see some proof, even if it is provided by MS I can't imagine how much bias can possibly make it say 99%. Even if it were 50% that would be huge.

This is not a feature that I would attribute to pure marketing.

 

This getting pretty trivial, in a million years I don't think one would notice a performance impact from the smartscreen filter built into IE. Being built into IE you get a lot less conflicts/crashes/performance impact/bugs than HIPS/toolbars, etc and its much more convenient. I've never been inconvenienced by FP's in the smartscreen filter, again I think we are nitpicking waaaaaay too much...

 

Here's an article about IE9's ability to stop attacks or not. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2283...ver_ie9_malware_blocking_stats.html#tk.hp_new

 

Well they bring up some fair points but really it's a very interesting idea and they agree that it can be helpful. However it's helpful in the way UAC is helpful. UAC will give you "false positives" in the form of stopping all elevating programs. People turn it off because they get annoyed or they just default to "yes" but that's why it's important to explain to people how features work. If someone were to use this feature and know how to use it properly it could be very helpful.