15 May 2002 Cumulative Patch for Internet Explorer

[Marianna]

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Title: * * *15 May 2002 Cumulative Patch for Internet Explorer
* * * * * *(Q321232)
Date: * * * 15 May 2002
Software: * Internet Explorer
Impact: * * Six new vulnerabilities, the most serious of which could
* * * * * *allow code of attacker's choice to run.
Max Risk: * Critical
Bulletin: * MS02-023

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-023.asp.
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Issue:
======
This is a cumulative patch that includes the functionality of all
previously released patches for IE 5.01, 5.5 and 6.0. In addition,
it eliminates the following six newly discovered vulnerabilities:


- A cross-site scripting vulnerability in a Local HTML Resource.
* IE ships with several files that contain HTML on the local file
* system to provide functionality. One of these files contains a
* cross-site scripting vulnerability that could allow a script to
* execute as if it were run by the user herself, causing it to run
* in the local computer zone. An attacker could craft a web page
* with a URL that exploits this vulnerability and then either host
* that page on a web server or send it as HTML email. When the web
* page was viewed and the user clicked on the URL link, the
* attacker's script injected into the local resource, the
* attacker's script would run in the Local Computer zone, allowing
* it to run with fewer restrictions than it would otherwise have.

- An information disclosure vulnerability related to the use of am
* HTML object provides that support for Cascading Style Sheets that
* could allow an attacker to read, but not add, delete or change,
* data on the local system. An attacker could craft a web page
* that exploits this vulnerability and then either host that page
* on a web server or send it as HTML email. When the page was
* viewed, the element would be invoked. Successfully exploiting this
* vulnerability, however, requires exact knowledge of the location
* of the intended file to be read on the user's system. Further,
* it requires that the intended file contain a single, particular
* ASCII character.

- An information disclosure vulnerability related to the handling
* of script within cookies that could allow one site to read the
* cookies of another. An attacker could build a special cookie
* containing script and then construct a web page with a hyperlink
* that would deliver that cookie to the user's system and invoke
* it. He could then send that web page as mail or post it on a
* server. When the user clicked the hyperlink and the page invoked
* the script in the cookie, it could potentially read or alter the
* cookies of another site. Successfully exploiting this, however,
* would require that the attacker know the exact name of the
* cookie as stored on the file system to be read successfully.

- A zone spoofing vulnerability that could allow a web page to be
* incorrectly reckoned to be in the Intranet zone or, in some very
* rare cases, in the Trusted Sites zone. An attacker could construct
* a web page that exploits this vulnerability and attempt to entice
* the user to visit the web page. If the attack were successful,
* the page would be run with fewer security restrictions than
* is appropriate.

- Two variants of the "Content Disposition" vulnerability
* discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-058 affecting how
* IE handles downloads when a downloadable file's
* Content-Disposition and Content-Type headers are
* intentionally malformed. In such a case, it is possible for
* IE to believe that a file is a type safe for automatic
* handling, when in fact it is executable content. An attacker
* could seek to exploit this vulnerability by constructing a
* specially malformed web page and posting a malformed executable
* file. He could then post the web page or mail it to the intended
* target. These two new variants differ from the original
* vulnerability in that they for a system to be vulnerable, it
* must have present an application present that, when it is
* erroneously passed the malformed content, chooses to hand it
* back to the operating system rather than immediately raise
* an error. A successful attack, therefore, would require that
* the attacker know that the intended victim has one of these
* applications present on their system.

Finally, it introduces a behavior change to the Restricted Sites
zone. Specifically, it disables frames in the Restricted Sites
zone. Since the Outlook Express 6.0, Outlook 98 and Outlook 200
with the Outlook Email Security Update and Outlook 2002 all read
email in the Restricted Sites zone by default, this enhancement
means that those products now effectively disable frames in HTML
email by default. This new behavior makes it impossible for an
HTML email to automatically open a new window or to launch the
download of an executable.

Mitigating Factors:
====================
Cross-Site Scripting in Local HTML Resource:

- A successful attack requires that a user first click on a
* hyperlink. There is no way to automate an attack using
* this vulnerability.

- Outlook 98 and 2000 (after installing the Outlook Email
* Security Update), Outlook 2002, and Outlook Express 6 all
* open HTML mail in the Restricted Sites Zone. As a result,
* customers using these products would not be at risk from
* email-borne attacks.

- Customers using Outlook 2002 SP1 who have enabled the
* "Read as Plain Text" feature would be immune from the HTML
* email attack. This is because this feature disables all
* HTML elements, including scripting, from mail when it
* is displayed.

- Any limitations on the rights of the user's account
* would also limit the actions of the attacker's script.

- Customers who exercise caution in what web sites they
* visit or who place unknown or untrusted sites in the
* Restricted Sites zone can potentially protect themselves
* from attempts to exploit this issue on the web.

Local Information Disclosure through HTML Object:

- It can only be used to read information. It cannot add,
* change or delete any information.

- The attacker would need to know the exact name and
* location on the system of any file they attempted to read.

- Only files that contained a particular, individual ASCII
* character could be read. If this single character is not
* present, the attempt to read the file would fail.

- Outlook 98 and 2000 (after installing the Outlook Email
* Security Update), Outlook 2002, and Outlook Express 6 all
* open HTML mail in the Restricted Sites Zone. As a result,
* customers using these products would not be at risk from
* email-borne attacks.

- Customers using Outlook 2002 SP1 who have enabled the
* "Read as Plain Text" feature would be immune from the
* HTML email attack. This is because this feature disables
* all HTML elements, including scripting, from mail when it
* is displayed.

Script within Cookies Reading Cookies:

- The specific information an attacker could access would
* depend on what information a site has chosen to store in
* its cookies. Best practices strongly recommend against
* storing sensitive information in cookies.

- An attacker would have to entice a user to first click on
* a hyperlink to initiate an attempt to exploit this
* vulnerability. There is no way to automate an attack that
* exploits this vulnerability.

- Mounting a successful attack requires that the attacker
* know the exact name of the target cookie. This
* vulnerability provides no means for an attacker to
* acquire that information.

- Outlook 98 and 2000 (after installing the Outlook Email
* Security Update), Outlook 2002, and Outlook Express 6
* all open HTML mail in the Restricted Sites Zone. As a
* result, customers using these products would not be at
* risk from email-borne attacks.

- Customers using Outlook 2002 SP1 who have enabled the
* "Read as Plain Text" feature would be immune from the
* HTML email attack. This is because this feature disables
* all HTML elements, including scripting, from mail when it
* is displayed.

Zone Spoofing through Malformed Web Page:

- A successful attack would require NetBIOS connectivity
* between the user and the attacker's site. Any filtering
* of NetBIOS, such as that found by ISP's or at the firewall
* perimeter, would thwart attempts to exploit this
* vulnerability.

- Any attempt to render a web site in the Trusted Sites zone
* would require very specific knowledge of custom configuration
* made by the user. This aspect of the vulnerability is not
* exploitable by default, nor does the vulnerability give the
* means to acquire the necessary information for that attack.

New Variants of the "Content Disposition" Vulnerability:

- Any successful attempt to exploit this vulnerability requires
* that the attacker know that the intended target have specific
* versions of specific applications on their system. The
* vulnerability gives no means for an attacker to know what
* applications or versions are present on the system.

- Any attempt to exploit the vulnerability requires that the
* attacker host a malicious executable on a server accessible
* to the intended victim. If the hosting server is
* unreachable for any reason, such as DNS blocking or the
* server being taken down, the attack would fail.

Risk Rating:
============
- Internet systems: Critical
- Intranet systems: Critical
- Client systems: Critical

Patch Availability:
===================
- A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
* Security Bulletin at
* http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-023.asp
* for information on obtaining this patch.

Acknowledgment:
===============
- Jani Laatikainen (jani@laatikainen.net) for reporting one of the
* "Content-Disposition variants.
- Yuu Arai of LAC SNS Team (http://www.lac.co.jp/security/) for
* reporting one of the "Content-Disposition variants.
- Cistobal Bielza Lino and Juan Carlos G. Cuartango from
* Instituto Seguridad Internet (www.instisec.com) for reporting
* the Zone Spoofing through Malformed Web Page vulnerability.

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[javacool]

As quick as it was up, now the page and download seem to be down...

-javacool

UPDATE: Page is just down - download is here: http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/...32/default.asp There are also reports it is available through Windows Update.