COMPROMISING ELECTROMAGNETIC EMANATIONS OF WIRED KEYBOARDS

[HURST]

-{ Quote: "
Computer keyboards are often used to transmit sensitive information such as username/password (e.g. to log into computers, to do e-banking money transfer, etc.). A vulnerability on these devices will definitely kill the security of any computer or ATM.

Wired keyboards emit electromagnetic waves, because they contain eletronic components. These eletromagnetic radiation could reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. Although Kuhn already tagged keyboards as risky, we did not find any experiment or evidence proving or refuting the practical feasibility to remotely eavesdrop keystrokes, especially on modern keyboards.
" }-

http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/keyboard/

[phyrewall]

While that is a very interesting experiment, it required too many devices to be unplugged in order to filter out the keyboard's transmissions. Who types on their laptop with the screen down (this turns off the LCD on most laptops), no power, and no mouse? The likely hood of this scenario happening in the wild is slim at best.

Also, this is not sudden news:
-{ Quote: "TEMPEST is a codename referring to investigations and studies of compromising emanations (CE). Compromising emanations are defined as unintentional intelligence-bearing signals which, if intercepted and analyzed, may disclose the information transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise processed by any information-processing equipment.

[...]

The term TEMPEST is often used broadly for the entire field of Emission Security or Emanations Security (EMSEC). The term TEMPEST was coined in the late 60's and early 70's as a codename for the NSA operation to secure electronic communications equipment from potential eavesdroppers[2] and vice versa the ability to intercept and interpret those signals from other sources." }-Source (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TEMPEST)

There are many TEMPEST grade (resistant to interception) peripherals and cables. I myself have created TEMPEST grade computer centers for a government. Honestly, as far as keyboard signal interception, simply wrapping your keyboard cable in a layer of heavy duty tin foil would be enough to block someone from picking up those specific signals without being completely obvious (ie sitting next to you). This, of course, is an option for the extremely paranoid.

Today's average desktop has so many processors, cabling, and peripherals sending out a barrage of signals that an attempt to decode them is highly unlikely to give useful results.

In my opinion, if you're that worried about signal interception, you could always build a Faraday Cage (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faraday_cage) around your computer room.

[bigc73542]

Actually if someone is that paranoid they might should just unplug their computer.;)

[fuzzylogic]

Apparently it only worked with older keyboards and that newer keyboards were make alot more insulation and were more resistant. I don't think i'd be too worried.