XeroBank vs Perfect Privacy

[[H]omer]

How does XeroBank (http://xerobank.com) compare to Perfect Privacy (http://www.perfect-privacy.com) in terms of:

Price
Speed
Bandwidth
Features
Trustworthiness
Security
Anonymity

In particular I'm interested in a claim I read elsewhere that XeroBank doesn't leak DNS queries, whereas other services do. Does anyone have any details of how XeroBank accomplishes this? Is it simply a question of pushing DNS through VPN? Does anyone know if Perfect Privacy also does this (I could find no info about this on their site)? Does XeroBank's "enhanced"? Tor network play any part in this, or is this something unrelated?

Indeed I'm rather confused as to what role Tor plays on XeroBank's network. Is their VPN and Tor combined into an über-secure + anonymous solution with multiple hops? Is that what makes it unique? Please explain.

I'm also interested in jurisdictional considerations. For example, Perfect Privacy has a server in Iran, which appeals to me in particular because it's about the least likely to be politically/legally compromised by pressure from the US/EU (no treaties). What jurisdictional safeguards does XeroBank offer (i.e. where are they)?

Can anyone here vouch for Perfect Privacy (precious little info elsewhere), either in technical terms or in terms of their trustworthiness?

Their own user community is either very small or very paranoid, as their forums are extremely sparse, so I thought I'd try here instead.

TIA.

[caspian]

I can't answer most of your questions but I am a Xerobank customer and I can tell you that as a free service, the XB Browser connects to Tor. Also the XeroBank machine, I think connects to Tor for free. If you upgrade to the VPN then Tor is not used at all and is in no way connected to their VPN service.. But the VPN *does* go through 3 hops and they are spread out over multiple jurisdictions. I think I am explaining this correctly.

I guess one of the biggest differences in Xerobank and other services is that they do go through mutiple hops where other services don't. But they do have a less expensive version for I think $10 coming soon. It is just a one hop sevice. But I will tell you that xerobank is the fastest that I have used so far so downloading is a breeze. I have a torrentfreedom account too just in case I need something extra.. And I have tried some others, like Metropipe. None of them come close to being as fast and smooth as xerobank.....and certainly not with 3 hops.

As for the server in Iran? I tried a service quite some time ago called Hide IP, (I think that was the name). And it had a server in Saudi Arabia. I tried to go to sites that were not even porn or anything and I would get this big notice on the screen written in Arabic and English. It basically said that the website was a bad website and that if you knew of any others like it to please report it so they could block them too. Now I am telling you that these websites were just normal sites. Sites that any kid could go to in the US and no one would think a thing of it. But anyway, I got a big warning sign with red letters. It came me the creeps big f*cking time! I would also not want to be associated with servers that are considered to be connected with terrorists.

[geazer40]

caspian has not used perfect privacy thats why he cant answer your ? i also cant answer that ? either but i know there is a member on here who can so hopefully he will shed some light


as far as xerobank is concernd speed is bad for me from uk unlike caspian he gets good speed but the main factor is my problems was never sorted from steve so after trial i left i am now with swiss vpn this month but will be changing to the other service you ask about from next month

[[H]omer]

Thanks for your reply.

OK, so I guess the only real difference between XeroBank and Perfect Privacy is the three hops, which I don't really care about anyway, since as long as the exit point is in a non-US/EU jurisdiction then I don't need to worry about "security letters" or logging. The Russians/Chinese/Iranians can log my activity all they want AFAIAC, so long as it doesn't end up in the hands of the NSA/MPAA/RIAA.

I'd still love to know about the DNS issue though.

Ref: Iranian terrorists. I don't want to go off topic, but I think it's rather narrow minded to equate an entire country with terrorists. I doubt the sysadmins at the Iranian server do much in the way of bombing. Also, there are terrorists in every country. E.g. I'm not going to boycott www.heanet.ie (hosts Linux mirrors) just because it's located in Ireland (IRA terrorists).

WRT website censorship, I'm not sure how, but Perfect Privacy's servers don't seem affected. I worked in Kuwait for a year as a civilian contractor to the US army, and used the Internet a fair bit during that time, but I can't say I saw much censorship, and what little their was I could easily bypass with CGI proxies. Certainly there was nothing much to be scared of over there, despite the war raging over the border. In fact it was rather dull. I did get a nice tan though. :D

[[H]omer]

Just FYI: So far I've tried Relakks (dog slow, very unreliable, and used the hideously insecure MS-PPTP (http://www.schneier.com/pptp-faq.html)), and I'm now in my first month of Perfect Privacy (seems pretty good so far, and according to speedtest.net I'm getting about 5.5Mb/s. Although I'm still concerned about DNS leaks).

[geazer40]

{QUOTE-> omer']Just FYI: So far I've tried Relakks (dog slow, very unreliable, and used the hideously insecure MS-PPTP (http://www.schneier.com/pptp-faq.html)), and I'm now in my first month of Perfect Privacy (seems pretty good so far, and according to speedtest.net I'm getting about 5.5Mb/s. Although I'm still concerned about DNS leaks). <-QUOTE}

i am with you on using them so any feedback i would welcome for when i join them as far as dns leak goes i cant answer that but i think they would not suffer that also i agree there servers are located in some of the best places so like you say the hop is not that inportant

try asking on there forum they do reply to ?s from peeps so worth a go

[[H]omer]

I'll see how it goes, and let you know. I've still got a couple weeks left before the sub runs out, but no problems at all so far.

BTW: I should mention that the speed I mentioned above (5.5Mb/s) is through their Russian server (I'm in the UK), so that's pretty awesome. I can't use their Tehran (Iran) server unless I sign up for at least a year.

[Someone]

Hi

Fuzzylogic mentioned Perfect Privacy here (http://www.wilderssecurity.com/showpost.php?p=1301884&postcount=13).

It seems that Perfect Privacy uses SSH and Xerobank uses VPN though I have no idea what the difference is.

I went to their websites and PP says it's 9.95 euros for one month plus one-time setup fee of 9.95 euros and Xerobank is 1 USD first month and 35 USD every month after that. So I guess PP is cheaper in the long-term.

[[H]omer]

Actually PP do both VPN and SSH. They also have a SOCKS proxy, Squid and I believe SSL POP/IMAP too.

I use the VPN since it covers everything with the minimum of hassle. I could do SSH tunnels selectively, but given the good speeds I'm getting over their network, I don't see the point.

I might give XeroBank a month trial anyway, just for comparison.

[Someone]

{QUOTE-> omer']Actually PP do both VPN and SSH. They also have a SOCKS proxy, Squid and I believe SSL POP/IMAP too.

I use the VPN since it covers everything with the minimum of hassle. I could do SSH tunnels selectively, but given the good speeds I'm getting over their network, I don't see the point.

I might give XeroBank a month trial anyway, just for comparison. <-QUOTE}
What's the difference between VPN and SSL and a SOCKS proxy and a Squid and SSL POP/IMAP?

Thanks

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> What's the difference between VPN and SSL and a SOCKS proxy and a Squid and SSL POP/IMAP?

Thanks <-QUOTE}

Well with VPN (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_network) you just start the service and it creates a "tap" or "tun" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TUN/TAP) device (think virtual NIC (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Interface_Controller)) through which all your IP data goes (hopefully including DNS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System)). You start it then forget about it, and it works system-wide. Although you need to be aware that if the tap suddenly dies then you'll no longer be secure (straight through). Good firewall rules can fix that (http://www.wains.be/index.php/2008/07/18/openvpn-routing-all-traffic-through-the-vpn-tunnel/) though, by basically blocking everything except the tap.

The net (ho-ho) result of this is that you are essentially moving the exit point of your IP data (also true of SSH), from your ISP's datacentre (where all those BOFH (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BOFH) are busily logging everything you do, then handing it over to the government; the MPAA; the RIAA or Dr. Evil), to some more enlightened jurisdiction uncorrupted by western totalitarianism and greed (assuming such a place exists). IOW it's a trade-off between who you trust more: Places like Russia; China and Iran, or your own country. Sadly, for many people the answer is increasingly the former, thanks to the Bush (http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_laws/)/Blair (http://www.backingblair.co.uk) administration and the rise of Corporatism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporatism).

Meanwhile, the only information the aforementioned BOFH at your ISP will be able to see/log, is that you have established a VPN connection to some server in e.g. Russia, and that you have transferred xxGB of data that month. That's it. That's all. He won't be able to tell where you're going or what you're doing beyond that bit of information, since the actual packets of data are all encrypted, and even an NSL (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Letter) or other forms of "coercion" from the government or "other parties" will be quite fruitless in unearthing the privacy of your online communications. They'd have to get multi-jurisdictional cooperation to do that, and given the types of places one can connect to (e.g. Iran), getting that "cooperation" might be damn-near impossible. IOW you're safe, or at least much; much safer than you would be otherwise.

With SSH you need to create a tunnel (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ssh_tunnel#SSH_tunneling) that maps a port on a remote server to a local port, then you route all data that would otherwise go directly to the Internet to your local port instead, where it is "tunnelled" (usually encrypted) to another (more secure) remote server (e.g. outside the jurisdictional boundaries of your locale's laws). The difference between this and VPN is that with SSH you need to either create multiple tunnels (one for each port), or map specific ports through that tunnel in one go ... and therefore know in advance which ports you're going to tunnel. This is not system-wide (each application needs to be configured to use the tunnel) and it doesn't automatically support every port (you have to specify).

The benefit of VPN is it's easier, and you can rest easy knowing that nothing is leaking out of the tap (ref: firewall rules). The benefit of SSH is you can pick and choose which ports and apps to run over the tunnel (which is necessarily slower than straight through the normal interface). So you could have e.g. BitTorrent running through an SSH (http://whalesalad.com/2006/08/27/tunneling-bittorrent-over-ssh/) tunnel (slower + secure), but Web browsing running as normal (faster + insecure).

SOCKS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOCKS) is the mechanism that enables you to forward ports from one server/port to another, and is typically used in conjunction with SSH for this purpose. I.e. this is what actually maps the ports when you start the tunnel.

Squid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Squid_(software)) is just a caching server, but if it's on a remote host over SSL then the details of your Web browsing etc. will be encrypted, and therefore unintelligible to your ISP. You still need to beware DNS lookups though. You could use a service like OpenDNS (https://www.opendns.com) to at least avoid your ISP logging your DNS (assuming they'd bother, or be able to log that much data). If some government agency was determined to discover what you were doing, they might be inclined to demand DNS logging on your account, although that by itself wouldn't be incriminating, they could correlate that with other data to draw conclusions about what they "believed" you were up to (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/18/samina_malik_appeal/).

IMAP/POP and SMTP over SSL/TLS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security) is just encrypted MX (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mail_transfer_agent) connections, which protects your Email from being logged/read by ISPs or other nasties (this is actually a legal requirement in the UK (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/05/16/isp_data_retention_directive/) now, so it's worth protecting it from snooping ISPs).

I'm no security guru (http://ekonefe.files.wordpress.com/2007/06/ugly-alan.jpg), this is just my very limited/simple understanding of the above, so I'm sure someone more knowledgeable will provide corrections (http://personal.riverusers.com/~thegrendel/idguide.html).

[LowWaterMark]

Off-topic, political postings that had nothing to do with this threads primary topic have been removed.

While it is understood that there is some overlap into politics when discussing some privacy issues, there is no need to bring up terrorists or government actions upon people in a thread that simply asks about the differences between XeroBank and Perfect Privacy.

[Someone]

{QUOTE-> omer']Well with VPN (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_network) you just start the service and ... <-QUOTE}OK. Thanks for the detailed explanations!

[zero2008]

This is for someone who's using Perfect Privacy, do they let you choose which server to connect to? According their site they have servers in US and Canada, I wouldn't want to be connected to those servers. Thanks.

[[H]omer]

Yes indeed, you can choose from 14 servers around the world, including China; Russia; Iran; the US (x4); Australia; the Netherlands; Germany (x2); Luxembourg; France and Canada.

You can connect to any of those servers at any time you want (Iran requires a 1 year subscription commitment), indeed I believe you can even chain multiple servers together, although I haven't tried that yet.

Most are classified as "unlimited traffic", and three are on 1Tbit pipes (Moscow; Amsterdam; France) , which give me a good 5-6Mb/s downlink.

[zero2008]

That's good enough speed for me. Thanks.

[Z32]

{QUOTE-> omer']Yes indeed, you can choose from 14 servers around the world, including China; Russia; Iran; the US (x4); Australia; the Netherlands; Germany (x2); Luxembourg; France and Canada.
<-QUOTE}

Please don't take this as criticism of the service, but doesn't having servers in China and Iran seem a little strange? What's the deal there.
* I should clarify, due to above posts.... I'm not calling Iran bad - referring more to global perception on the whole. It's not exactly low-profile.

+ How does the # of hops Perfect Privacy makes affect its service (in theory/practice), versus XeroBank?

+ any updates on DNS leaks?

Cheers

[[H]omer]

Ref: China and Iran.

Having a proxy in a certain country is useful for more than just privacy issues, there is also the question of foreign access to services which block foreign IPs, using GeoIP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geoip) data.

E.g. In the UK, television catch-up services like iPlayer and Sky Anytime block non-UK IPs. There may well be similar resources in China and Iran that ex-patriots wish to access.

Also, consider that privacy on the Internet can never be 100% ... somebody always knows what you are connected to (exit node), therefore "privacy" is relative to whom you wish to keep your private activity hidden from. In my case, I am only concerned with preventing my own ISP and government from knowing my private business, and I simply don't care if foreign interests unaffiliated with my country know what I'm doing. That immediately precludes the UK; the EU and the US, who might just as well be a single country from a jurisdictional perspective. Countries which have poor diplomatic relations with that "super-jurisdiction" are especially interesting to me, since they are the least likely to cooperate with that cartel to expose my online activity.

From that perspective, Iran may actually be the best possible proxy for my needs. Certainly there is nothing I do which the Iranians would find even the least bit interesting, and there is little they could do about it even if they did (beyond disconnection).

I demand the right to privacy, but my government has revoked that basic human right (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/08/19/ukgov_uber_database/), therefore I have no alternative but to seek "cyber-refuge" in a country with the least diplomatic relations to my country. Right now, that would seem to be Iran.

Ref: Hops

The default service is one hop only, however it is my understanding that multiple OpenVPN connections can be tunnelled through each other, or multiple SSH connections, or various combinations of OpenVPN; SSH; SOCKS proxies; Squid caches; etc. I have yet to experiment with that, so if you need confirmation then please contact PP directly for more information. I do currently use the Squid cache on the same server that I connect to with OpenVPN, but that is more to speed up my browsing, than for additional security reasons.

The more jurisdictional hops involved, the more difficult it is for authorities to demand access to your private data (logs, if any ... or live monitoring), since they'd need "cooperation" from many different foreign authorities, some of which may prove to be completely uncooperative (Iran). PP do not keep logs, but the governments in the EU or US have regulatory powers to coerce PP server admins in those countries to capitulate with their demands (e.g. via a National Security Letter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Letter)). This is why it is essential to avoid connecting through countries which cooperate with such demands. In that sense, the number of hops is actually less important than the location of the final hop, if that final hop is outside of the jurisdiction of those authorities one wishes to evade.

Ref: DNS leaks.

This issue is resolved.

OpenVPN can push DNS records, dependant on the server configuration. PP's servers do indeed push DNS records, however actually utilising that data requires an extra step on certain operating systems. In my case, I run Fedora Linux, and the solution is to use scripts contributed by the OpenVPN project itself, in the "contrib/pull-resolv-conf" directory (client.up and client.down).

The login and DNS process is now a fully automated service on my systems. Note that automated login to OpenVPN services is not possible under Windows, without rebuilding OpenVPN from sources to enable that feature (disabled by default, for some reason).

[Z32]

Thank you for that very informative reply Homer! I think I'm just about up to speed on how these work now :)

While it's my understanding that everything transmitted through the VPN would look like regular secure connection/VPN traffic, and essentially be indecypherable jibberish to people outside of the loop (ISP/govt), there was one (potentially noobish!) follow-up question that popped into my head -

Could your ISP (and by extension, home government), see that you were establishing/maintaining a connection to an ~Iranian server (GeoIP) of some kind.. or is there a step I'm missing?

Putting aside the fact they wouldn't be able to determine the nature of the data traffic between you & the server, if they could see you're maintaining a secure connection with ~Iran (home internet > Iranian ip), wouldn't that potentially raise red flags/shine a spotlight on your internet activity? Would be fair enough if you're a bad guy doing bad things....rather unfortunate if you just want to keep your private life private :o

Cheers

[SteveTX]

Have a server in Iran does a few things.

Because Perfect Privacy is a single-hop network, your ISP may flag you as suspicious for being connected to servers in Iran. If you're using their PPTP protocol, then you're probably still leaking what website you're visiting from Iran, all the way back to local ISP. Maybe, maybe not. Then once you are connected through the Iran proxy, you have to deal with the Iran firewall which is strong on censorship.

To me it's kind of like going through a rabbit hole only to come out in a cage on the other side.

For each user they'll have to determine what's best for them, but most of them aren't capable of deciphering all the pros and cons themselves.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Could your ISP (and by extension, home government), see that you were establishing/maintaining a connection to an ~Iranian server (GeoIP) of some kind.. or is there a step I'm missing? <-QUOTE}

Yes, there is no way to hide the IP of the (first hop) VPN server you are connecting to from your ISP, however this is all they can see, along with the total volume of traffic that you shift over that connection. Your ISP cannot see anything beyond the VPN server (i.e. the ultimate destination IPs), nor decipher the actual contents of that data. All they see is white-noise encrypted data and a single IP pair (yours plus the VPN).

{QUOTE-> wouldn't that potentially raise red flags/shine a spotlight on your internet activity? <-QUOTE}

The ISP/government can "red flag" anything they want, but the fact remains that it is not actually illegal to simply establish an authorised VPN connection to Iran ... or anywhere else. They might very well be suspicious, but there is nothing legal they can do about it - short of disconnecting you, and even the legality of that is questionable.

If I had to choose between raising the suspicions of my government, or allowing them unfettered access to all my private communications, then it's no contest ... I'll take privacy every time, and live with any consequences.

ISPs log everything they are able to anyway, indeed they are required to do so by law in the UK and EU (I don't know about the US, but just look at the AT&T scandal), so worrying about "raising suspicions" is rather moot. It surely can't get any worse than being subject to the constant surveillance that we must already endure.

Then there is the possibility that the government might invoke "special powers" to detain you (e.g. Patriot Act), which is just a license to do anything they want without proof of any actual crime (i.e. circumvent the democratic process).

Let's be honest, under such conditions, which are tantamount to Marshal Law, all bets are off. Governments operating under such a system don't actually need an excuse, much less any tangible evidence, to detain you, so worrying about "raising their suspicions" is a waste of time. They've already declared everyone guilty anyway, with their revocation of our basic rights. It is precisely because of their intrusion into my privacy, that I need to use VPN services in the first place, and that's exactly what I'll tell them if/when they ever "detain" me for questioning. I look forward to the seeing the public's reaction to me being imprisoned because "he might have been committing a crime, but we don't know what it was, or even if he committed any crime at all". The backlash of outrage would likely see an end to our present "Big Brother" political climate.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> your ISP may flag you as suspicious for being connected to servers in Iran. <-QUOTE}

Good luck to them.

I look forward to reading their list of legal citations, not that a blank page will take very long to read, mind you.

{QUOTE-> If you're using their PPTP protocol <-QUOTE}

I don't, I use OpenVPN and SSH. I'd hope that everyone should know by now that PPTP is useless.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Because Perfect Privacy is a single-hop network, your ISP may flag you as suspicious for being connected to servers in Iran. <-QUOTE}

Here's another thing to consider. Let's assume that I establish a two hop VPN from the UK to Iran via Amsterdam. What's to stop the Dutch government from flagging that first hop as "suspicious", then invoking "special powers" to detain me through an extradition order, or shop me to my own authorities?

If an ISP is inclined to flag as suspicious any connection to Iran, then it doesn't really matter how many hops it takes to get there, nor which country that final hop takes place, if the location of that hop is in a jurisdiction that "cooperates" with the governments in all the intermediate hops.

But if the whole point of moving the end-point of your Internet communications is to avoid your local jurisdiction, and all those who cooperate with it, then it's inevitable that you're ultimately going to have to connect to somewhere that this jurisdiction deems "suspicious", because it is the very lack of "cooperation" that makes it so.

IOW it isn't "connecting to Iran" that is suspicious per se, it's taking successful measures to evade surveillance, that automatically brands us as "criminals".

There's no way to win this one, since you must choose between not "raising suspicions" by connecting to a "friendly" country that may ultimately betray you, or successfully secure your communications by "suspiciously" connecting to an "unfriendly" country.

Personally, I'm quite happy for my government to be as "suspicious" as they like. I'm sure it bothers them a whole lot more than it bothers me.

[SteveTX]

Pause.

How does the Dutch government know your UK connection to them is the same one connecting to Iran? They don't, unless your traffic is unencrypted and unprotected.

[[H]omer]

Presumably the Dutch OpenVPN server (B) can see which IPs are connecting to it (A), and which IPs it in turn is connecting to (C). OpenVPN must bridge those connections somehow, otherwise a connection could not be established from A -> B -> C. "B" won't be able to see the decrypted contents of the packets, but it should be able to deduce which IP at "A" connects to "C". Therefore anyone (government agent) with root access to "B" will know who at "A" is making that connection.

You've admitted yourself that you have the ability to make such deductions: "we get notified of someone hacking bank accounts with our system, we will look into it and respond with prejudice if we can verify it". How else could you possibly deduce that "A" was hacking "C", if you can't make the correlation between those two points?

Remember the assertion is that merely making a connection to Iran is "suspicious". The encrypted data in this case is irrelevant.

What I'm suggesting is that this "suspicion" will exist regardless of the number of hops involved, and that therefore multiple hops do not, in and of themselves, evade that suspicion, it merely moves the source of that suspicion from one location to another.

[Smirs]

I tried PP openvpn for a few days now, both my ebay and paypal accounts got locked the very same day I accessed them through the Perfect Privacy service, ebay sent me a message stating that my password has been tampered with, while Paypal locked my account under "..Your account has been randomly selected for a security check up..."
Any advice?

[SteveTX]

Homer,

We can't reverse the traffic stream back to an incoming IP without very serious work, live during the stream. Definitely nobody external to us can do that unless they are a global adversary, and even then they will still have lots of trouble. We use channel multiplexing and stream mixing technologies. When we run a server, you can't tell which stream goes where or belongs to whom, unless there was only one or two people using the system, which definitely isn't the case ;)

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> We can't reverse the traffic stream back to an incoming IP without very serious work, live during the stream. <-QUOTE}

The difficulty is not in question, it is still nonetheless possible, and as you have already stated - necessary in cases of serious crime.

{QUOTE-> Definitely nobody external to us can do that <-QUOTE}

A government agent with a warrant, sitting at a console in your data centre, would not be external.

{QUOTE-> When we run a server, you can't tell which stream goes where or belongs to whom, unless there was only one or two people using the system, which definitely isn't the case ;) <-QUOTE}

Either you can or cannot successfully investigate serious crimes committed through your servers. Which is it?

If you can, then so can other parties who may coerce you to cooperate with their demands - ethical or otherwise (ultimately you must obey the law). If you can match "A" to "C" for the purposes of criminal investigation, then you (or others coercing you) can do likewise for less reasonable purposes (NSL), such as branding your customers as potential "criminals" merely because they connect to an "unfriendly" country.

If you can't, then you are basically admitting that your TOS/AUP is unenforceable, and that criminals can have free reign on your networks. The upside to this is that I am actually wrong; my privacy is in fact 100% secure; and I may connect to any country I wish with complete impunity, "unfriendly" or otherwise.

Its a nice dream.

Although this does bring us back to the question of why multiple hops are necessary in the first place, if this multiplexing makes identification virtually impossible anyway.

So I must conclude that identification is merely difficult rather than impossible, which is why multiple hops are necessary to provide an additional layer of difficulty ... whilst still being possible. And this possibility means that additional hops will not actually permanently protect me from being identified as a customer connecting to an "unfriendly" country.

My ultimate conclusion is therefore that I might just as well connect directly to that "unfriendly" country in one hop and be done with it, safe in the knowledge that the "friendly" country's government agent will not be given cooperation by the "unfriendly" country to spy on me. Meanwhile I must live with the knowledge that as far as my "friendly" country's government is concerned, I am a "suspect" no matter what I do, one way or another, simply because I choose to deny them unfettered access to my private communications. But there is little they can do about it either way, whilst they lack any concrete evidence of "wrongdoing" (FSVO: "wrong"), thanks to the protection of my privacy afforded to me by the "unfriendly" country that will not "cooperate" with others to spy on me.

QED.

[SteveTX]

{QUOTE-> omer']
A government agent with a warrant, sitting at a console in your data centre, would not be external.
<-QUOTE}

Sure he is. He doesn't have access to decrypted data streams or internal systems. All he can do is look at encrypted streams. No system access. He's just as SOL in langley as he is at the datacenter. But if you've got the NSA coming after you, nobody can help you for long.

{QUOTE->
Either you can or cannot successfully investigate serious crimes committed through your servers. Which is it? <-QUOTE}

Your questions are somewhat technical, and we have covered this in great depth here before. Please look into the logs or pose your question at the XeroBank forum (http://forum.xerobank.com) so we don't waste anyone else's time here.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Sure he is. He doesn't have access to decrypted data streams <-QUOTE}

Again I repeat, the data is irrelevant, so the fact that it is encrypted is moot. The question is whether or not customers can be identified by their IP addresses, and if it can be determined which destination addresses they connect to. Multiplexing or no, clearly they can, otherwise you wouldn't be able to enforce your AUP.

{QUOTE-> or internal systems <-QUOTE}

How would you deny a government agent access to your "internal systems", if he demanded that access backed up with a warrant?

{QUOTE-> All he can do is look at encrypted streams. <-QUOTE}

And the IP addresses.

{QUOTE-> But if you've got the NSA coming after you, nobody can help you for long. <-QUOTE}

Presumably even the mighty NSA don't have much influence in Iran, hence my interest in that country.

{QUOTE-> Your questions are somewhat technical, and we have covered this in great depth here before. Please look into the logs or pose your question at the XeroBank forum (http://forum.xerobank.com) so we don't waste anyone else's time here. <-QUOTE}

Actually my questions were not directed specifically towards XeroBank (other than the OP where I asked about prices, etc.). I'm merely pondering the impact of jurisdictional considerations on VPN privacy services in general.

[SteveTX]

{QUOTE-> omer']Again I repeat, the data is irrelevant, so the fact that it is encrypted is moot. The question is whether or not customers can be identified by their IP addresses, and if it can be determined which destination addresses they connect to. Multiplexing or no, clearly they can, otherwise you wouldn't be able to enforce your AUP. <-QUOTE}

Yes they can. But not by anyone without internal access to a few different servers.

{QUOTE->
How would you deny a government agent access to your "internal systems", if he demanded that access backed up with a warrant?
<-QUOTE}

US/UK/EU government agent doesn't have jurisdictional authority. At least for xb.


{QUOTE->
Actually my questions were not directed specifically towards XeroBank (other than the OP where I asked about prices, etc.). I'm merely pondering the impact of jurisdictional considerations on VPN privacy services in general. <-QUOTE}

For all other services, jurisdiction is a big big deal. It is their weakpoint. I agree. I did a post on this on my blog (http://portableprivacy.blogspot.com/2007/07/privacy-national-security-letters.html) some time ago.

[[H]omer]

In your blog post you write: "we operate out of high-privacy jurisdictions like Germany".

But surely Germany is subject to the European jurisdiction I've been talking about, and it doesn't exactly have a great civil rights record on privacy:

{QUOTE-> German privacy activists cry foul over data retention law (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/01/02/german_data_retention_objection/)

...

Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung argues that the data retention law treats all citizens as potential terrorists or delinquents. "The pervasive logging of communication patterns without reasonable suspicion resembled a serious encroachment upon the basic values of constitutional legality," it said.

Organisations and individuals that rely on confidentiality to do their work - lawyers, journalists and even crisis lines - are deprived of free and open communication because of the data logging, the group claims.

Governments across Europe brought in the measures, which backers argue are necessary in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Critics argue blanket data retention is disproportionate. <-QUOTE}

{QUOTE-> German Police Arrest Admin of Tor Anonymity Server (http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/09/16/1648237)

"In a recent blog posting, a German operator of a Tor anonymous proxy server revealed that he was arrested by German police officers at the end of July. Showing up at his house at midnight on a Sunday night, police cuffed and arrested him in front of his wife and seized his equipment. In a display of both bitter irony and incompetence, the police did not take or shut-down the Tor server responsible for the traffic they were interested in, which was located in a data center, over 500km away. In the last year, Germany has passed a draconian new anti-security research law and raided seven different data centers to seize Tor servers. While back in 2003, A German court ordered the developers of a different anonymity network to build a back-door into their system." <-QUOTE}

Germany is clearly no more of a safe data haven than the UK (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/08/19/ukgov_uber_database/) or anywhere else in Europe (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/14/eu_data_retention_vote/).

[SteveTX]

Look at the date of the post. Just a year ago Germany was a privacy haven. Things have changed drastically since then. For those of us who deal with data retention laws, we know that we aren't forced to comply till January 2009.

[Hillsboro]

{QUOTE-> omer']In your blog post you write: "we operate out of high-privacy jurisdictions like Germany".

But surely Germany is subject to the European jurisdiction I've been talking about, and it doesn't exactly have a great civil rights record on privacy:
. <-QUOTE}

It is all a canard, FUD that Xerobank spouts. They offer nothing security wise that can not be found cheaper someplace else. The fact of the fact of the matter is; if there is a suspected security issue in regards to terrorist activity or child porn the exit servers will be compromised, the US, Panamanian, or whatever, government will cooperate and Steve will find himself compelled to give up information under FISA or any other laws are now on the books.

They have a exit server in the Nederlands too. They have to retain logs. His contention that all they will see is an encrypted stream is true, but as you say, it is moot. All any EU, Asian, North, Central, or South American jurisdiction needs is a court order from another jurisdiction that there is suspected illegal activity taking place and that is the end of it. Steve for all his talk and claims will, as I have said before, roll over in a heart beat. Anyone would. He does not want to be held on obstruction of justice, contempt of court, or aiding and abetting. Any suspected illegal activity taking place and he will have to establish he is innocent and not a party to that activity by his full cooperation. His web site already states they will cooperate with LEA's and not be a party to illegal activities. So what is the point of paying more for something if you all you want to do is keep your ISP from snooping on where you are going on the web? As I said, it is really all a canard – FUD – nothing more ('Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain.').

If You want a German exit point, go with Steganos. They are in Germany and have been offering VPN services for a few years now. If someone has something they need to hide from possible on demand government scrutiny; pay services such as Xerobank have nothing to offer to make you immune to discovery.

Steve is a business man. There is nothing wrong with that. What he is selling is a service. It is all marketing. It is a bit like buying a car. It is transportation and there are all kinds of bells and whistles you can get; very fancy or very plain. But at the end of the day all it does is get you from point A to point B. They all do it and none will save you from serious injury of death is you get hit by a 40 tonne lorry on the motorway. In this case, the 40 tonne lorry is the government.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> we know that we aren't forced to comply till January 2009. <-QUOTE}

At which point it's game over for VPN privacy services in Europe, not that the current situation is any more tenable, given previous government actions.

So this brings us right back to the dire need to completely avoid the US; the EU; and their political allies, in at least one of the hops taken to the destination IP (preferably the last or only hop).

I'm not saying that multiple hops are completely redundant (anything that makes life more difficult for government spies is fine by me), but AFAIAC at least the exit point would need to be in an "unfriendly" country, and AFAIAC any other hops would be redundant if they were inside "friendly" countries. Multiplexing and multi-jurisdictional complications will certainly slow the process of invading our privacy down, but it won't stop it completely if those jurisdictions are cooperative with such demands, so by far the best defence is complete relocation to "unfriendly" jurisdictions that offer zero cooperation to such processes. By all means let's have multiple hops ... contained completely within these "unfriendly" jurisdictions.

I think in the near future all privacy services will need to be relocated completely outside of the US/EU/allies boundaries of jurisdictional control. Of course the result will be that VPN privacy subscribers will "look suspicious" for connecting to such countries, as far as those subscribers' respective governments are concerned, but this seems to be the increasingly unavoidable price for communications freedom and privacy. And as I've said before, we're all "suspects" now anyway, in the present political climate. At least, with a VPN service located in an "unfriendly" country, we'll be "suspects" with our privacy intact.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> It is all a canard, FUD that Xerobank spouts. They offer nothing security wise that can not be found cheaper someplace else. <-QUOTE}

XB does seem to be one of the few (or only?) VPN services offering multiple hops, which is useful, but only if they avoid jurisdictions such as the US; the EU; and their allies, IMHO. So overall I'd agree that XB's services are not as compelling as Steve makes out (he is understandably biased after all), but by the same token I'm disinclined to dismiss XB out of hand either. However, I do find XB's prices rather prohibitive.

{QUOTE-> Steve is a business man. There is nothing wrong with that. What he is selling is a service. It is all marketing. <-QUOTE}

I suppose it is difficult for him to discuss these issues without plugging his own company's products, but his enthusiasm does somewhat come across as spammy hyperbole. I'm not knocking Steve personally ... I'm sure he's a perfectly nice guy, but he clearly has a vested interest, so it's hard to be sure of his impartiality. In particular I'm immediately suspicious of those who imply any given security measure is infallible, and Steve does tend to lean in that direction, so that worries me.

Personally I have an extremely pessimistic and paranoid view of security, and live by the creed that nothing is safe, but some measures appear somewhat safer than others. Protection requires that a specific threat is identified, and right now that threat is (as you say) the government (i.e. the governments of the "West", who have implemented the telecommunications equivalent of Marshal Law). Any solution to that threat must therefore require circumventing those laws, and AFAICT the only way to do that is to circumvent the countries that enforce those laws. This means connecting to servers located outside that jurisdiction. I simply don't see any alternative, short of political revolution.

[SteveTX]

Hillsboro,

It is clear that you have knowledge, but a lack of understanding to accompany that knowledge. I would love to respond to all of your points, but not on this forum, as it is inappropriate here.

Homer,

The view of allies is over-simplified as it doesn't take data obfuscation and observability techniques into account. Again, I'm happy to discuss it on xerobank forum at length. Otherwise, I can't participate in bench-racing during amateur hour. :) Let the umbrage taking begin!

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> I'm happy to discuss it on xerobank forum <-QUOTE}

My questions are not directed specifically at or about XB, they are general queries regarding jurisdictional considerations, therefore I don't see the point of limiting my discussions to just one privacy service company's own forums, especially as I'd prefer impartial advice regarding the relative merits of more than just one company.

However, if I ever become an XB customer, I'll be sure to pay those forums a visit.

[SteveTX]

{QUOTE-> omer']My questions are not directed specifically at or about XB, they are general queries regarding jurisdictional considerations, therefore I don't see the point of limiting my discussions to just one privacy service company's own forums, especially as I'd prefer impartial advice regarding the relative merits of more than just one company.

However, if I ever become an XB customer, I'll be sure to pay those forums a visit. <-QUOTE}

Well, here is the problem. You're right: everyone (else) is suffering from those problems. xb isn't. because of that it limits the discussion of success or dissent to xb. We could infact discuss some other service, but the thread title is xerobank vs. perfect privacy. So if it isn't about either of those two, it isn't pertinent to the thread. It isn't going to be about PP because they aren't multijurisidctional, and it isn't going to be about xb because that discussion goes on our forum. So you're talking about a topic with no subjects, or you're discussing the purely theoretical, which is academic because the internet isn't flat.

[Hillsboro]

{QUOTE-> Hillsboro,

It is clear that you have knowledge, but a lack of understanding to accompany that knowledge. I would love to respond to all of your points, but not on this forum, as it is inappropriate here. <-QUOTE}

As I said I don't think you are doing anything wrong in that you are marketing a service and you do know what you are talking about. Unfortunately, we live in a changing word thanks to much of the FUD and Orwellian style of a certain political regime that has resulted in the loss of many personal freedoms we once took for granted. Especially for those in America and there has been some backlash from the rest of the free world in this regard. Nevertheless you have to function under these constraints too. So at the end of the day it is hard to stay off the grid in a police state where the the court have allowed the constitution to be subverted fir the so called greater good (Orwellian, Yes?). That there is lays the rub. You mentioned Germany. Germany is a republic and much of the constitution there is similar the American one in regards to personal freedoms and privacy rights. So we have come full circle, IMHO.

You have a lot of good things to say and ideas, but Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Stasi) like agencies are coming into there own again and holding sway. I know of what I speak as I was living in West Germany during the 70's and early 80's and saw this first hand (I am in my 60's). To those of us who lived in close proximity of this, the parallels are all rather concerning. The only difference is it is more subtle where you are. Still the courts have abandon the constitution in favor of the States mandates of the need to protect the people and therefore certain freedoms must be sacrificed for the greater good.

Least someone say this is all political and forbid to be discussed here I would like to say this is, IMHO, very on topic in regards to security and privacy and it is at the very heart of the topic being discussed here because without personal freedom there can be no real personal privacy

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Well, here is the problem. You're right: everyone (else) is suffering from those problems. xb isn't. <-QUOTE}

It's statements like that which make me question your impartiality and objectivity, especially as there is clearly a potential jurisdictional problem with at least one of your servers (Germany). PP suffers from the same issues of course, but they also offer more secure alternatives. XB may well also offer similar alternatives, but I won't know unless you volunteer that information.

{QUOTE-> the thread title is xerobank vs. perfect privacy. <-QUOTE}

That is indeed how this thread started, however it rapidly became a more generic discussion of the relative merits and detriments of connecting to countries like Iran, and more general jurisdictional considerations. You may have noticed that I did actually change the subject line at one point (http://www.wilderssecurity.com/showpost.php?p=1310292&postcount=23), to better reflect the direction in which the discussion was progressing.

{QUOTE-> So if it isn't about either of those two, it isn't pertinent to the thread. <-QUOTE}

If a thread develops organically, whilst still pertaining to relevant subject matter, then that seems perfectly acceptable to me, and I don't think it's up to anyone but forum moderators to decide otherwise.

{QUOTE-> you're discussing the purely theoretical <-QUOTE}

The anti-privacy laws which are being forced on citizens in the West are not "theoretical", neither are the measures those citizens are using to circumvent those laws. The countermeasures that Western governments might use to undermine that circumvention may be mysterious (to me at least), but refusing to acknowledge that threat is an extremely irresponsible attitude. Those "theories" need to be explored, if a solution (pre-emptive or otherwise) is to be found, and that is exactly what I am doing.

As I've already stated earlier in this thread, "I'm no security guru", I'm just someone who is concerned for his own privacy, as our civil rights are being revoked one by one. I bow to your superior technical knowledge of security issues, but my concerns are not purely based on technical considerations, they are mainly based on political issues that may have technical solutions. Naturally I want to utilise the best technical solutions to those problems, but I can't do that unless others describe to me what they are, and back that up with some assurances based on details, rather than sideline my political concerns because they are supposedly "theoretical", whist making vague and boastful claims of technical superiority.

It's not surprising that you'd choose to join a discussion that contains the word "XeroBank" in the title, but please don't expect to take over that thread; shut it down; then move it somewhere else for your own convenience. I'm not an XB customer, and I have questions here that extend beyond just that one company. The general principles of VPN security, and the legal and political ramifications of utilising those services, interests me far more than the advertising literature of a single company, so if you're uncomfortable discussing matters of a more theoretical and generic nature, then I'm sure no one is forcing you to contribute to this thread.

Thanks for stopping by though.

[Z32]

{QUOTE-> omer']At least, with a VPN service located in an "unfriendly" country, we'll be "suspects" with our privacy intact. <-QUOTE}

Homer - while I agree with almost everything you're saying, and am finding the intelligent discussion between you & SteveTX very informative and interesting, I feel that ^ statement seems to contradict the aim of what you're trying to achieve.

We've established that your ISP/govt. would see you establishing an encrypted connection to a very unfriendly nation like Iran...

{QUOTE-> omer']
Yes, there is no way to hide the IP of the (first hop) VPN server you are connecting to from your ISP, however this is all they can see, along with the total volume of traffic that you shift over that connection. Your ISP cannot see anything beyond the VPN server (i.e. the ultimate destination IPs), nor decipher the actual contents of that data. All they see is white-noise encrypted data and a single IP pair (yours plus the VPN). <-QUOTE}

..now on top of the possibility of this raising several red flags, they can't establish what you're doing with that connection without a) being able to access your computer or b) being able to access that Iranian server.

Now since the perceived advantage of Iran is that they're unfriendly and therefore wouldn't comply with any requests for data, hypothetically we could assume that your govt's next step may be a) electronic and/or physical surveillance? I don't think we can assume they wouldn't investigate your connection once they became aware of it, nor be unable to find legal grounds to do so.

If we can assume you're merely wishing to preserve your privacy, not to do anything immoral/break the law, then having the govt. watching you electronically or physically perhaps isn't beneficial to your objective of establishing/maintaining privacy - irrespective of the legality of your online conduct - they'd be sticking their noses in your business.

Of course that is entirely speculative... but what isn't. I'm not trying to attack you personally, but rather questioning the logic behind using Iran versus Russia, Netherlands, ?, etc. They may be slightly more receptive to requests from your govt., but they may not raise any red flags to begin with.

So in an effort to lighten the mood, I'll say this: God help you if you buy your lawn fertiliser in bulk ;D

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Now since the perceived advantage of Iran is that they're unfriendly and therefore wouldn't comply with any requests for data, hypothetically we could assume that your govt's next step may be a) electronic and/or physical surveillance? <-QUOTE}

Yes, there are some uncomfortable choices to make:


Be a good little citizen, don't use VPN at all, and allow the government unfettered access to all your private communications
Use VPN, but only connect to "friendly" countries, thus raising a small amount of suspicion for attempting to evade surveillance, but risk being monitored at the exit point
Use VPN connected to an "unfriendly" country, thus raising red flags (with other possible consequences), but rest easy in the almost certain knowledge that your government has no access to the exit point, unless they're prepared to risk espionage in a hostile country to obtain that information


Of course the "possible consequences" of "3" is a Tempest attack (http://www.wilderssecurity.com/showthread.php?t=8708) (monitoring electromagnetic emissions) or other forms of more direct surveillance, but then there are counter-surveillance techniques for dealing with Tempest and others, and even if the government successfully penetrates my defences, they'll have wasted a huge amount of resources just to discover that all I'm doing is watching videos on YouTube (and other equally innocuous activities).

What the government undoubtedly fails to realise, is that I'm not protecting my privacy because I have something illegal to hide, I'm doing it out of principle. Let them waste their time and taxpayer's money discovering that fact if they want to.

You may argue that the government wouldn't escalate their attempts if I didn't give them "due cause" to do so, by connecting to an "unfriendly" country, but as I've said before - in a society that has degenerated into a state of near-Marshal Law, all bets are off. The fact is they don't actually need an excuse (they have an agenda), and (given recent changes in the law (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_105/l_10520060413en00540063.pdf)) they clearly don't even need warrants to carry out their surveillance, so provoking them with "suspicious" behaviour is a moot consideration, since we are all "suspects" all of the time anyway.

None of the above three choices are "safe", but as a point of principle I prefer option "3", because it's the option that makes life as difficult as possible for my assailants. IOW I'm making a stand, and I'll live with the consequences.

Also consider the possibility that in the future a much larger number of people might be using such services, possibly even using the most radical solutions available to escape this Surveillance Culture. Under such circumstances, the governments of the "West" would find themselves overwhelmed and impotent in the face of such resistance, forcing them to either back down or escalate to military action (actual Marshal Law). In either case we win, because the latter scenario would result in revolution. I can't predict which one of those two scenarios is most likely, but I do predict that at least one of them will happen, if the governments of the "West" continue with their present agenda of destroying our democracy and freedom.

[axle00]

I'm pretty sure Tempest attacks are *much* more difficult to do (at least discretely from a non-suspicious distance) against flat screen (non CRT) monitors, as they emit far less radiation.

[SafetyFirst]

As much I believe Steve Topletz is a person of integrity and high professional standards, still I would never confide my privacy to a company having their servers in US and/or EU. By default I consider them honeypots. Not because they surely are, but because they might turn to ones any day without any warning. I don't think Germany is any better than US or UK (remember JAP backdoor story and Tor exit nodes raid).

If I could chain servers in Cuba, Venezuela or Libya maybe I would feel a little bit more secure from Big brother's eyes, but I would never feel completely safe with any service where all my privacy relies on one person operating the exit point.

Until decentralized systems like Freenet or I2P gain their maturity and stability I'll keep on using Tor.

[Z32]

I'm still not sure about Iran, but as long as you're comfortable with the pros/cons of the route you're taking, then that's all there is to it.

Thanks for posting those links - regarding the EU (pdf), I do wonder how long it'll be before all of the member states have adopted that legislation? The timeframes they cited don't appear accurate (i.e. Germany = supposedly 2009). That aside, it's sounding more like the U.S. every day!

Speaking of the U.S. & deprivation of privacy/liberties, this article (http://poorbuthappy.com/yourthing/post/could-we-see-a-new-e-patriot-act/) does make you wonder how deep the rabbit hole actually goes. It'll be a sad day when any/all of the points mentioned within, come to pass. Quite an interesting article. You'd think that under significant political pressure, that their allies would soon follow suit....causing yet another global domino effect. No wonder we're all getting paranoid...the internet's going to hell in a Walmart handbasket. This article (http://www.infowars.com/?p=2640) at infowars.com is also rather alarming (to be taken with a grain of salt).

The Tempest attack, is quite shocking in how simply it appears to be carried out. I'm almost certain they used that on the tv show Numb3rs, as the concept sounded immediately familiar (lol, terrible I know). Free YouTube streams costing the taxpayer thousands of $$... that would be amusing.

I do hope that your vision of the future comes true - i.e. people wake up en mass at some point & realise it's all gone too far - but I can't help but think of the boiling frog story (the frog heats up so gradually it's cooked before the thought occurs to jump out of the pot). Thankfully it's been disproven, so there's hope for us all yet :)

[Z32]

{QUOTE-> If I could chain servers in Cuba, Venezuela or Libya maybe I would feel a little bit more secure from Big brother's eyes, <-QUOTE}

You never know, Steve might be planning a holiday sometime soon ;D

{QUOTE-> but I would never feel completely safe with any service where all my privacy relies on one person operating the exit point. <-QUOTE}

Me neither. Although I think I'd rather be able to put a face to a service I was using, than to not know anything about the people behind it. Unbeknownst to us, Steve could well be the PR guy for an occult society ;), but who/where are the people behind the likes of Tor (node operators) and even other for-profits? I haven't seen them offering assistance, conjecture, nor even plugging their services on here... which is a pity. What do Tor operators have to gain from providing such services for free, anyway? Where are all the Tor nodes located? I'd like to believe it's a humanitarian/philanthropic gesture, but I can't help but be wary of a free lunch.

I guess there's no way to be 100% content with either Tor or paid services? I would like to see XeroBank with a few more *interesting* hops like those mentioned above..though having said that, I don't know enough about its inner-workings to make a qualified comment :). It's great to get feedback about the various services available for the privacy-conscious though, so I hope people keep reporting here about their experiences.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Speaking of the U.S. & deprivation of privacy/liberties, this article (http://poorbuthappy.com/yourthing/post/could-we-see-a-new-e-patriot-act/) does make you wonder how deep the rabbit hole actually goes. It'll be a sad day when any/all of the points mentioned within, come to pass. <-QUOTE}

I vote to scrap the Internet, and start again with a protocol like "RFC 1149 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1149.txt): A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams on Avian Carriers" (carrier pigeons). This protocol was successfully tested in 2001 (http://www.blug.linux.no/rfc1149/), so we know it works. In fact it's already been updated to "RFC 2549 (http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2549.txt): IP over Avian Carriers with Quality of Service", which includes an "Air Miles" rewards system.

However, we will need to come up with a bullet-proof security system.

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/04/images/080429-pigeon-picture.jpg

[Z32]

{QUOTE-> omer']I vote to scrap the Internet, and start again with a protocol like "RFC 1149 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1149.txt): A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams on Avian Carriers" (carrier pigeons). <-QUOTE}

Haha, I think that's all a bit high-tech for me :). Although, with all the Avian Carriers around here, I could probably start a global ISP overnight...I'll give it some serious thought.

[caspian]

I have a Perfect Privacy account. I got it for the Tunnel. I like the idea of being able to choose from several IP addresses to something completely different when I want to. I run it through my Xerobank VPN. I tried Moscow and it's pretty cool.

XB VPN is definitely my primary privacy tool though and I am thoroughly convinced that it is superior. And I don't see how anyone can argue that 3 hops is no big deal. It would take some serious effort to get subpoenas from all 3 places at the same time. It would require time, resources, and money. I would think that it would take a very *serious* crime for anyone to go to that much trouble. So in that case I am not the least bit concerned.

And please lets not pretend that having the business set up in Panama is not helpful. Sheese!

I still think Iran is a scary idea. Anything that goes through them is subject to whatever they feel like doing. I don't know much but I have heard that they filter a lot and I am wondering if they may even hack into your system. They are no friend to freedom of speech or press, and they certainly don't care about human rights. What is really scary is if you live in the US and it is discovered that you are communicating through Iran, you will be an automatic target. No one would stick up for you. You will lose your privacy.....the very thing you are trying to protect. I bet they could hack into your computer and you wouldn't even know it. I wouldn't touch that with a 10 foot pole. I may be wrong but I am going to avoid that option.

Again, I do have a PP account, and I like the tunnel, but I did notice one thing. When I do a search in Google, I get the same message that I got when I tried Tor. It says that my query looks suspicious and they refuse the search. I guess I could just use Yahoo search when I turn on the tunnel insted of Google. No biggie.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> I don't see how anyone can argue that 3 hops is no big deal. <-QUOTE}

The location of those servers is more significant than the number of hops. I consider multiple hops in (what amounts to) a single "cooperative" jurisdiction, to be less secure than one or more hops in an "uncooperative" jurisdiction.

{QUOTE-> And please lets not pretend that having the business set up in Panama is not helpful. Sheese! <-QUOTE}

If a VPN service provider incorporates his company in (what I assume is) an uncooperative country like Panama, then that only really helps the owner of that company to avoid prosecution, it doesn't really help his customers who connect through servers in cooperative jurisdictions (e.g. Germany). Customers are legally responsible for their own actions, and it is the laws relevant at the exit point (and the customer's home country) which apply, not the laws of the country in which the VPN service provider has incorporated.

{QUOTE-> I still think Iran is a scary idea. Anything that goes through them is subject to whatever they feel like doing. <-QUOTE}

Exactly the same can be said about anywhere else, but the governments of the West have a very specific agenda (http://antitrust.slated.org/censorship/acta-proposal-2007.pdf) that threatens my civil rights pertaining to my online activity. The "threat" from Iran is of a very different nature that is irrelevant to that activity. Weighing up the balance of those two threats, I find the threat from my own government (and its allies) to be far more significant. I've never even seen an Iranian, much less witnessed an act of terrorism first-hand. Iran may well be my government's enemy, but they've given me no personal reason to be mine. Indeed I find it's my own government that's increasingly becoming my "enemy", as they systematically revoke my civil rights, and our society degenerates into Marshal Law. Iran has not attacked me in this way, or any other way, so until they do then I won't consider them a "threat".

{QUOTE-> When I do a search in Google, I get the same message that I got when I tried Tor. It says that my query looks suspicious and they refuse the search. <-QUOTE}

If you research that error message, you'll find this is a common problem that affects many people, not just those using tor; PP; or any other VPN service. Where many different people share the same IP, if one of those people abuse the system (DDoS; spam; etc.) then that IP may end up on a DNSBL (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSBL), and subsequently people sharing that IP will find their online activity inhibited in certain ways. If you've ever had an Email rejected by a receiving MX server and wondered why, then this is one possible explanation, since one of your ISP's or Email service provider's other customers may have been sending spam through the same MX server you use to send Email. Certainly with PP this is not a serious problem, since you have the ability to simply switch servers on the fly, and that DNSBL record will be purged once the abuse activity stops.

[SteveTX]

{QUOTE-> omer']The location of those servers is more significant than the number of hops. I consider multiple hops in (what amounts to) a single "cooperative" jurisdiction, to be less secure than one or more hops in an "uncooperative" jurisdiction. <-QUOTE}

This is an oversimplification. Some countries have MLATs, some don't, some have intelligence services, others rely on local governments and investigation units. This extends also to defining your attacker. If you are against an intelligence agency with superpowers, mlats don't matter, nor does the term "uncooperative". Perhaps you would be surprised to learn that US intelligence services have agents in strategic network positions to help them monitor traffic in "uncooperative" areas. Well, sure, but who can help such a person fleeing from NSA? That was already outside of the threat model. The answer is there is no quick "cooprative" vs "uncooperative" classification. You need to know how each country handles the other, at what level of interest and resource for the subject of surveillance. Unfortunately such intimate knowledge of how signal intelligence works and is processed is neither public nor available to the public.

{QUOTE->
If a VPN service provider incorporates his company in (what I assume is) an uncooperative country like Panama, then that only really helps the owner of that company to avoid prosecution, it doesn't really help his customers who connect through servers in cooperative jurisdictions (e.g. Germany). <-QUOTE}

I'll disagree. That quite specifically prevents a country (like germany) from being able to submit a court order based on traffic streams (they know the traffic but not the user) to discover a user identity/incoming IP address.

Getting back to routing traffic through countries like Iran... a little wakeup check. Those are the strong censorship countries that are always spying on users. Those are the countries that will execute you for being seen talking to a woman who is not your wife. You think you've got more privacy and security routing through Iran? You're routing directly into a honeypot.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> Some countries have MLATs, some don't <-QUOTE}

Here's a handy reference:

http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_690.html

I might be inclined to use that list to determine which jurisdictions I trust more than others, since AFAICT the root of the "problem" is who does or doesn't cooperate with the US (Ground Zero for the spread of our "Big Brother" culture). Every country has one kind of agenda or another, but ultimately it boils down to which one of those agendas actually impacts my life most negatively, and in the context of my privacy and civil rights - that's the "West", not Iran.

{QUOTE-> Perhaps you would be surprised to learn that US intelligence services have agents in strategic network positions to help them monitor traffic in "uncooperative" areas. <-QUOTE}

As I've already stated (http://www.wilderssecurity.com/showpost.php?p=1311746&postcount=43), none of the options are "safe", but some are "safer" than others. I can't prevent espionage, but I can make life as difficult as possible for my assailants, rather than just give up and grant them unfettered access to my private communications. Seeking the "safe harbour" of uncooperative jurisdictions won't prevent espionage, but it is currently the maximum resistance I can offer, AFAICT.

{QUOTE-> (they know the traffic but not the user) to discover a user identity/incoming IP address. <-QUOTE}

So you say, but I find your overconfidence in the infallibility of multiplexing obfuscation rather disturbing. If you (i.e. the server admin) can ascertain that information for the purposes of enforcing your AUP, then others can also obtain that information from the same source, by coercing that admin with legal demands, if that "source" (i.e. the server, not the company) is within their (or their allies') jurisdiction. You could incorporate your company on the planet Mars, but if the connecting server is located in Germany then those connecting through that server are subject to German laws ... as is that server's admin.

I'm quite prepared to believe it is technically difficult to identify someone on a multiplexed VPN stream, but the technical difficulty is not in question ... it's the legal and jurisdictional issues that concern me. Connecting to a server in an uncooperative jurisdiction is the most legal resistance I can offer to my assailants. Adding the complexity of multiple hops to that equation certainly won't do any harm, but it's of little use if it can be circumvented with the law, utilising the cooperation of multiple friendly jurisdictions. Yes it's difficult, but getting cooperation from Iran, or other "unfriendly" jurisdictions, is much more so.

{QUOTE-> Getting back to routing traffic through countries like Iran... a little wakeup check. Those are the strong censorship countries <-QUOTE}

As someone with experience living and working in the Middle-East, I can tell you that these "censorship" issues are greatly overrated, unless one is an aficionado of pornography. Regardless, I'd rather endure a little censorship than the blatant violation of my privacy for specific agendas relating to such things as "Intellectual Property", for example.

{QUOTE-> that are always spying on users. <-QUOTE}

Let them. You seem to be missing the point that it isn't the action that matters, it's the motive, and the power to act on that motive. Tell me, what exactly could the Iranians do to me thousands of miles away? What would be their motive for taking that action? Who exactly would they share their findings with? Somehow I really don't think the Iranians would care that I was merely trying to evade Western surveillance, in fact I think they'd be quite sympathetic to my cause.

So if the Iranians want to "spy" on me, then let them. I really don't care. Having some foreign "unfriendly" country spy on me, for reasons completely unrelated to the West's various insidious agendas, means nothing to me. It might matter if I was working for my own government's intelligence services, but as a private citizen who only wishes to protect my privacy from my own government, it's of zero interest to me what (if anything) these "unfriendly" countries see of my online activity.

{QUOTE-> Those are the countries that will execute you for being seen talking to a woman who is not your wife. <-QUOTE}

I'm too busy dealing with the problems in my own culture, to worry about judging another on the basis of something that is irrelevant to the actual predicament. Somehow I don't think I'm going to be stoned to death for bigamy any time soon. I'm sure the Iranians find some of our practises (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guantanamo_Bay_detention_camp) equally immoral. So which of these cultures has the moral high-ground? Neither, AFAICT. And how is this relevant to the problem at hand?

{QUOTE-> You're routing directly into a honeypot. <-QUOTE}

If it is a "honeypot", then at least it's one that's unlikely to fall into the wrong hands, or at least an order of magnitude less likely than one located in the West.

[SteveTX]

Excellent responses. Let's get busy:

{QUOTE-> omer']So you say, but I find your overconfidence in the infallibility of multiplexing obfuscation rather disturbing. If you (i.e. the server admin) can ascertain that information for the purposes of enforcing your AUP, then others can also obtain that information from the same source, by coercing that admin with legal demands. <-QUOTE}

I see where the confusion is. Let me clarify it... Who is the administrator of the server? Where is the administrator located? For xb, the administrator is Xero Networks AG, the administrator is not located in Germany. The multiplexing is enough to obfuscate from external analysis by non-intelligence agencies. There's nobody in germany, or subject to germany's jurisdiction, to perform rubberhose decryption on.

When it comes down to it, the corp needs to be willing to have integrity and say "no", not matter what or whom is attempting to compel. Because most corps exist for the purpose of staying in business and producing profit, I could see how that is a problem for them.

{QUOTE->
If it is a "honeypot", then at least it's one that's unlikely to fall into the wrong hands, or at least an order of magnitude less likely than one located in the West. <-QUOTE}

I suppose that depends on if your traffic sensitivity is limited geopolitically. I don't like anyone spying on my traffic, but I would really detest having my traffic analyzed by a totalitarian gov than a republic, their aims are very different. Further, your risk in a honeypot isn't just passive logging, it's also stream injection, which a republic's isp won't typically be allowed to do without massive blowback. When there isn't a relatively free press, all kinds of evil practices can go on with that internet traffic. For example, it has been discovered that some chinese ISPs are doing traffic injection of malware to track people and perform additional investigations. That isn't very likely in a republic.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> I see where the confusion is. Let me clarify it... Who is the administrator of the server? Where is the administrator located? For xb, the administrator is Xero Networks AG, the administrator is not located in Germany. The multiplexing is enough to obfuscate from external analysis by non-intelligence agencies. <-QUOTE}

OK, I see your point now.

If the server is in a datacenter in Amsterdam, but the server administrator is in China, and only he has root access, then even if the Dutch police raid the datacenter, they'll have no root access to the server, regardless of whatever legal powers they posses, and thus will be forced to use only external monitoring, which is insufficient to determine individual IP routes from a multiplexed stream using real-time analysis.

However, from January next year you (the company) will be compelled by European law to perform logging on those servers, and the datacenter will have to ensure compliance from all its customers (you), or refuse you any service. Indeed it seems places like the UK are set to make out-of-band logging mandatory, and if this becomes commonplace across the rest of the EU then investigators won't even need root access to the servers. I don't track similar changes to the law in the US, but with initiatives like ACTA it seems like all MLAT jurisdictions will eventually be similarly compromised. In the mid to long term, I think avoiding such jurisdictions is inevitable. It'd certainly make me feel a lot happier.

{QUOTE-> I don't like anyone spying on my traffic, but I would really detest having my traffic analyzed by a totalitarian gov <-QUOTE}

But in a privacy and civil-rights sense, the governments of the West are becoming increasingly totalitarian (http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202423144224):

{QUOTE-> After two of its executives had their laptops and other electronic devices seized and searched at U.S. airports in May, BAE Systems PLC -- the U.K.-based defense and aerospace giant -- found itself facing a travel risk that many companies had never considered: that U.S. officials could search, inspect and copy data from international travelers' electronic devices without a warning or warrant.

For BAE, the searches signaled an escalation in the Justice Department's high-profile, yearlong investigation into allegations of foreign corrupt payments. For the rest of the international business community, they signaled what may be a new trend in law enforcement. With increasingly global companies and increasingly portable technology, these searches would let the government access any data that travelers bring across the border on their laptops, BlackBerrys, cellphones or other electronic devices -- without warrants, probable cause or reasonable suspicion. <-QUOTE}

{QUOTE-> Further, your risk in a honeypot isn't just passive logging, it's also stream injection <-QUOTE}

On the exclusively Linux systems that I use, that's a minimal risk, especially with SELinux MAC context enforcement which inhibits even root access if it breaks policy (not that I'd ever run OpenVPN as root).

Of course absolutely any system on the Internet could be a honeypot, in Iran or otherwise. I have no way of knowing, or even continuing to guarantee that any previously trusted system is still trustworthy. Like I said earlier in the thread, it's a question of who I trust more, my own country or some foreign power that's unfriendly to my government. Increasingly I find it's the latter, especially as any supposed "honeypot" in an unfriendly country would be unlikely to forward their findings to an MLAT jurisdiction. It's more likely they'd just be motivated by curiosity or paranoia. Let them look, I don't care. I've still accomplished my goal of thwarting my assailants' efforts.

Countries like China and Iran certainly have agendas that don't align with my own, but AFAICT neither China's communism nor Iran's fundamentalist religious doctrine have any bearing on my privacy, nor even my civil rights as they pertain to the country I live in. If those countries, for all their extremist ideologies, can assist me to escape my own country's unique brand of totalitarian extremism, then I trust them to provide that specific service far more than I trust my own country to uphold my rights, since those countries have agendas that are irrelevant to that specific goal.

{QUOTE-> That isn't very likely in a republic. <-QUOTE}

You haven't been paying close enough attention to political developments in the West. This is not conspiracy theory. The legal frameworks and policies for a complete reversal of democracy are already in place.

[SteveTX]

{QUOTE-> omer']OK, I see your point now.

If the server is in a datacenter in Amsterdam, but the server administrator is in China, and only he has root access, then even if the Dutch police raid the datacenter, they'll have no root access to the server, regardless of whatever legal powers they posses, and thus will be forced to use only external monitoring, which is insufficient to determine individual IP routes from a multiplexed stream using real-time analysis.
<-QUOTE}

100% Exact.

{QUOTE->
However, from January next year you (the company) will be compelled by European law to perform logging on those servers, and the datacenter will have to ensure compliance from all its customers (you), or refuse you any service. Indeed it seems places like the UK are set to make out-of-band logging mandatory, and if this becomes commonplace across the rest of the EU then investigators won't even need root access to the servers. I don't track similar changes to the law in the US, but with initiatives like ACTA it seems like all MLAT jurisdictions will eventually be similarly compromised. In the mid to long term, I think avoiding such jurisdictions is inevitable. It'd certainly make me feel a lot happier. <-QUOTE}

Now you're getting it. Here's the next part: With each connection, we can pick a multi-hop circuit that breaks the logging trail. If the Netherlands logs, we use an entry node that doesn't, and even if they secretly do we already multiplex the traffic. So even if netherlands logs, the outgoing traffic only gets reversed into multiplexed encrypted streams that can't be demuxed except by an intelligence agency monitoring the entry nodes as well as the exits. At that point, you've automatically elevated the effort required by the attacker to a point outside of the threat model: if you are less than an intelligence agency, you have no chance against us. Thus the burden of xb is met.

{QUOTE->
But in a privacy and civil-rights sense, the governments of the West are becoming increasingly totalitarian (http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202423144224):
<-QUOTE}

Couldn't agree more. However, I think of it kind of like i think of expatriation: If you leave, you're giving up and your lack of a presence make totalitarianism that much easier to attain. The end result of that people will hop to cooler spots until the whole world is hot with totalitarianism. You keep your traffic and the world safer by digging into a foxhole. I would hate to think my traffic is safest under the sword of sharia law.

{QUOTE->
You haven't been paying close enough attention to political developments in the West. This is not conspiracy theory. The legal frameworks and policies for a complete reversal of democracy are already in place. <-QUOTE}

Having a system in place, and using it are two different things. Although admittedly one typically follows the other. The trick, for us, is to know when take our hand off the burner. It is our job to know when what tools and laws and methods are being used. That's what allows us to still operate where we do. We know the DCs. We know the govs. We know their MO and how they deal with enacted laws.

[[H]omer]

{QUOTE-> With each connection, we can pick a multi-hop circuit that breaks the logging trail. If the Netherlands logs, we use an entry node that doesn't <-QUOTE}

Which pretty soon won't be any MLAT jurisdiction.

{QUOTE-> and even if they secretly do we already multiplex the traffic. So even if netherlands logs, the outgoing traffic only gets reversed into multiplexed encrypted streams that can't be demuxed except by an intelligence agency monitoring the entry nodes as well as the exits. <-QUOTE}

Which in MLAT jurisdictions will be possible, if difficult.

Basically it still sounds to me as if there's no way to avoid being compromised unless at least one hop is outside MLAT jurisdictions. Again, the difficulty is not in question.

{QUOTE-> Couldn't agree more. However, I think of it kind of like i think of expatriation: If you leave, you're giving up and your lack of a presence make totalitarianism that much easier to attain. <-QUOTE}

Well I'm only "leaving" in the sense that I'm circumventing surveillance. I'm still a citizen with voting rights, and the power to speak out against injustice ... whatever little good that may do me in a totalitarian regime, since the will of the people seems to mean very little to Western politicians these days. I can't believe that the majority would actually have voted for RIPA; ACTA; The Patriot Act; the DMCA; or Software Patents, for example, had they actually been given any say in the matter. The fact is that my "powers" are no more effective in my own country than they would be if I emigrated elsewhere. I'm not leaving, but I might just as well, since AFAICT nothing short of revolution can turn back the tide of totalitarianism in the West now.

{QUOTE-> You keep your traffic and the world safer by digging into a foxhole. <-QUOTE}

It's a nice sentiment, but that foxhole won't do you any good against the approaching tanks. There's only two solutions - run or fight, and AFAICT the ordinary citizens of the West have no ammunition left to fight with (politically speaking). We can either keep running or take to the streets. Eventually the latter may actually happen, but until mainstream support for dissidence grows sufficiently to make that viable, I guess I'll have to keep running. I don't plan on being an army of one. I'll just continue being a "surveillance fugitive" until the system finally claims another martyr.

{QUOTE-> I would hate to think my traffic is safest under the sword of sharia law. <-QUOTE}

Is it any safer under the sword of Bush (http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_laws/)?

{QUOTE-> Having a system in place, and using it are two different things. <-QUOTE}

It's coming.

[scrty001]

{QUOTE-> I have a Perfect Privacy account. I got it for the Tunnel. I like the idea of being able to choose from several IP addresses to something completely different when I want to. I run it through my Xerobank VPN. I tried Moscow and it's pretty cool.
<-QUOTE}

I have xerobank as well and I was wanting to know if it would be possible to change my IP address. Xerobank normally gives you a canada or netherlands IP so if you use the method you're using, you can change that canada or netherlands IP? So, if you go to check your IP it will display one of those PP IP's?

Is there any advantage to anonymity with method? Or it's just to change your IP?


Thanks

[Geko21]

Steve, I will ask a question fully realizing that it is not possible for you to give an affirmative answer, but I would nevertheless appreciate some bit of honesty here. Has your company ever been in a difficult situation regarding authorities - i.e. have you been forced to assist in a government investigation against a customer of yours?

[SteveTX]

{QUOTE-> Steve, I will ask a question fully realizing that it is not possible for you to give an affirmative answer, but I would nevertheless appreciate some bit of honesty here. Has your company ever been in a difficult situation regarding authorities - i.e. have you been forced to assist in a government investigation against a customer of yours? <-QUOTE}

No investigation yet has ever compromised the identity of a xerobank customer.

[caspian]

{QUOTE-> I have xerobank as well and I was wanting to know if it would be possible to change my IP address. Xerobank normally gives you a canada or netherlands IP so if you use the method you're using, you can change that canada or netherlands IP? So, if you go to check your IP it will display one of those PP IP's?

Is there any advantage to anonymity with method? Or it's just to change your IP?


Thanks <-QUOTE}

I am not too sure about anything except that I can tunnel through the VPN and, from what I understand, it goes through Xerobank and then on to the tunneler server, and then out from there. As far as it being any more or less secure, I don't know. But it seems like it should be okay. I don't think I'll be using it that often, but it is fun to use here and there. I get a kick out of it, anyway.